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Donative And Interspousal Transfers Of
Community Property In California:




Prior to 1985, a transmutation of community property into
separate property, separate property into community property, or
separate property of one spouse into separate property of the other
spouse could be effected by either an express or implied agreement
between a husband and wife.' An express agreement to transmute
property could be either written or oral.2  However, oral
transmutation agreements were required to be executed, not
executory Other contract requirements, such as consideration,
1. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 244, 255, 105 Cal. Rptr. 483, 490
(1972) (citing Dickson v. Dickson, 225 Cal. App. 2d 752,756,37 Cal. Rptr. 718,720 (1964); Mears
v. Mears, 180 Cal. App. 484,499,4 Cal. Rptr. 618, 628 (1960); James v. Pawsey, 162 Cal. App. 2d
740, 749, 328 P.2d 1023, 1029 (1958)) (stating that an agreement changing the character of property
from separate to community may be either express or implied). The origin of the transmutation rule
was the Act of 1850, which provided that spouses could contractually change their property rights
by either antenuptial or postnuptial contracts. 1849-50 Cal. Stat. ch. 103, sec. 15, at 254.
2. See, e.g., Woods v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 46 CaL 2d 697, 701, 299 P.2d 657, 659
(1956) (stating that separate property may be converted into community property at any time by oral
agreement between the spouses); In re Wieling's Estate, 37 Cal. 2d 106, 108, 230 P.2d 808, 810
(1951) (stating that a husband and wife can change the character of property by oral agreement).
3. In re Raphael's Estate, 91 Cal. App. 2d 931, 939, 206 P.2d 391, 395 (1949). See, e.g.,
Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal. 2d 754, 757, 154 P.2d 905, 907 (1944) (holding that an oral agreement
made at the time the deed to land purchased with separate funds was executed was effective to
transmute separate property of husband to community property). Cf. Mather v. Mather, 25 Cal. 2d
582, 586, 154 P.2d 684, 686 (1944) (stating that "if a transaction is fully executed on both sides, it
is not property described as a contract [citation omitted], but, as a transfer of title to property, is more
closely akin to a conveyance.").
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were generally ignored.4 Thus, pre-1985 transmutation agreements
were not required to be in writing, comply with the statute of
frauds, carry consideration other than mutual promises, or
specifically identify existing property.5 The California courts had
basically abandoned the contract theory as essential to effect
transmutations, holding that transmutations could be implied by the
conduct of the parties.6
In 1984, in response to the apparent ease with which a
transmutation of property could be facilitated, the California
Legislature adopted four statutes to revise or codify existing law.7
These statutes were intended to clarify transmutations of
community property into separate property, separate property into
community property, and separate property of one spouse into
separate property of the other spouse.'
The first of the four new statutes, California Civil Code section
5110.710, provides that married persons, by agreement or transfer
and without consideration, may transmute community property into
the separate property of either spouse, transmute the separate
property of either spouse into community property, or transmute the
separate property of one spouse into the separate property of the
other spouse.9 Section 5110.710 is generally consistent with
4. See, e.g., Marriage of Jafeman, 29 Cal. App. 3d at 255, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 490 (stating that
-[n]o particular formalities are required for an effective agreement"); James, 162 Cal. App. 2d at
749,328 P.2d at 1029 (stating that an agreement between spouses to change the character of property
need not be executed with any particular formality); Raphael's Estate, 91 Cal. App. 2d at 939, 206
P.2d at 396 (1949) (rejecting contention that an executed oral agreement is not enforceable because
it lacked necessary requisites of a valid contract).
5. W. REPPY, COMMUNITY PROPERtTY IN CALIFORNIA 28-39 (2d ed. 1988).
6. See, e.g., Nelson, 224 Cal. App. 2d at 143, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 355 (1964) (stating that no
express or formal agreement is required to transmute separate property into community property "if
it may be fairly inferred from all the circumstances and evidence that a community interest was
intended by the parties").
7. See 1984 Cal. Stat. oh. 1733, sec. 1-4, at 6301-02 (enacting CAL. CtV. CODE §§ 5110.710-
5110.740).
8. 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1733, sec. 1, at 6301 (enacting CAL. Cv. CODE § 5110.710). Section
5110.740, which is not discussed in this Article, provides that a declaration made in a will as to the
character ofproperty is not admissible as evidence of a transmutation of the property before the death
of the declarant. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110.740 (West Supp. 1991).
9. Id (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
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existing statutes and case law relating to marital property
agreements and was enacted merely to provide clarification."0
The second new statute, California Civil Code section
5110.720, subjects transmutations to the laws governing fraudulent
transfers." While there is case authority which supports the
application of fraudulent transfer laws to transmutations, 12 section
5110.720 codified existing law and was an important
clarification.' 3
California Civil Code section 5110.730, the third new statute,
completely changed California community property law. 4 Section
5110.730 provides that, effective for transfers made on or after
January 1, 1985, a transmutation is not valid unless it is made in
a writing that includes an express declaration that is "made, joined
in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest is
adversely affected."'" Further, a transfer of personal property,
such as wearing apparel, jewelry, or "other tangible articles of a
personal nature" used solely or principally by the donee spouse
and "not substantial in value taking into account the circumstances
of the marriage" are excepted. 6 Section 5110.730 is inapplicable
when commingling of separate and community property is
involved."7
The written express declaration requirement of section 5110.730
was first applied in Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald.'8 In
MacDonald, the husband received a pension plan distribution which
was conceded to be community property. 9 He deposited those
10. Id § 5110.710, Legislative Committee Comment (West Supp. 1991).
11. Id § 5110.720 (West Supp. 1991).
12. See, e.g., Bailey v. Leeper, 142 Cal. App. 2d 460, 464-65, 298 P.2d 684, 687 (1956)
(holding that evidence supported finding that a husband's transfer of real property to wife defrauded
the husband's creditors under the Fraudulent Conveyance Act, California Civil Code §§ 3439-
3439.12).
13. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110.720, Legislative Committee Comment (West Supp. 1991).
14. CAL. Crv. CODE § 5110.730 (West Supp. 1991).
15. Id § 5110.730(a),(e) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
16. Id. § 5110.730(c) (West Supp. 1991).
17. Id § 5110.730(d) (West Supp. 1991).
18. 51 Cal. 3d 262, 794 P.2d 911, 272 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1990).
19. Id at 265, 794 P.2d at 913, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
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funds into three individual retirement accounts (IRA).20 The IRA
adoption agreements included a beneficiary designation, which
provided that if the husband did not name his wife as the sole
primary beneficiary to the IRAs, the wife was required to sign a
consent form.2' The husband named a living trust as his
beneficiary, the terms of which provided that his wife was to
receive a life estate in the income of the living trust.22 The
remainder of the trust corpus was left to his children from a prior
marriage.' The wife signed the consent forms which read:
"Being the participant's spouse, I hereby consent to the above
designation." 24 At the time the wife signed the consent forms, she
was terminally ill.' Contemporaneously with executing the
consent forms, the husband and wife divided their remaining
property into separate estates.26 The wife sold her half of the
community property and placed the proceeds in a separate account
for the benefit of her children.27  When the wife died
approximately six months later, the executrix of her estate sought
to assert a community claim against the IRAs.28
The trial court held that the deceased wife's signature on the
consent forms constituted a waiver or transmutation of her
community rights in the IRAs, effectively transferring those rights
to her husband.29 Thus, the wife's community interest in the IRAs
was transmuted into the separate property of her husband." This





24. Id at 265 n.2., 794 P.2d at 914, n.2, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 156 n.2.
25. Id at 264-65, 794 P.2d at 913, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
26. Id
27. Id at 265, 794 P.2d at 913, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
28. Id at 265-66, 794 P.2d at 914, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
29. Id at 266, 794 P.2d at 914, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
30. Id
31. Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 213 Cal. App. 3d 456, 261 Cal. Rptr. 653, 656
(1989).
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California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of
appeal.3
2
The California Supreme Court determined that there was no
substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that the wife
intended to transmute her community interest in the IRAs into the
separate property of her husband.33 Even if there was such
evidence, the court concluded that the legislative intent of
California Civil Code section 5110.730 was to overturn the prior
easy transmutation rule and to require an " 'express declaration'
... that the characterization or ownership of the property is being
changed." ' The court's decision was based, in part, on Estate of
Blair, 5 which held that joint tenancy property was not transmuted
into community property merely by listing it as community
property in the wife's petition for legal separation nor by the
husband's deposition in which the husband stated that he believed
the property at issue was community property.36 The MacDonald
court found that the consent forms signed by the wife contained no
language which expressly characterized the property or indicated a
change in the ownership of the funds.3'
The MacDonald court conceded that the statute is vague and
does not indicate what language the writing itself should
contain." In defining what language would be sufficient to satisfy
the express declaration requirement of section 5110.730(a), a
majority of the court held that it was not necessary to use the word
32. Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262, 273, 794 P.2d 911, 919 272 Cal.
Rptr. 153, 161 (1990).
33. ld. at 267, 794 P.2d at 914-15, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 156-57. The California Supreme Court
stated: "In fact, there is absolutely no record evidence [sic] relating to [the wife's] intentions or state
of mind when she signed the adoption agreements." Id
34. Id. at 272,794 P.2d at 918,272 Cal. Rptr. at 160. See California Law Revision Comm'n,
Recommendation Relating to Marital Property Presumptions and Transmutation, 17 CAL L
RavisioN COMM'N REP. 224-25 (1984) [hereinafter Commission Report].
35. 199 Cal. App. 3d 161,244 Cal. Rplr. 627 (1988).
36. Id. at 168, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
37. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d at 272-73,794 P.2d at 918-19, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 160-61.
38. Id. at 268, 794 P.2d at 915, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
365
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"transmutation" or other specific language in a transfer writing.39
Words of gift, such as, "I give to the account holder any interest
I have in the funds.. .," would be sufficient.40
Although the California Supreme Court sought to limit its
review in MacDonald, the court appeared to give tacit approval to
one other issue that was resolved by the court of appeal: the
application of the "terminable interest rule. ' 4' Initially, Mr.
MacDonald had sought to invoke the terminable interest rule, since
the IRA funds at issue were derived from a pension plan.42 The
terminable interest rule provides that when a nonparticipating
spouse predeceases the participating spouse,43 the community
interest of the nonparticipating spouse in the surviving spouse's
pension and/or retirement plan automatically terminates.44 The
trial court rejected this argument, finding that the IRAs were not
benefits of the husband's pension plan.45 The court of appeal
affirmed, holding that the terminable interest rule had been
retroactively abolished by the adoption of California Civil Code
section 4800.8.46 However, the court of appeal expressed doubt
about whether the terminable interest rule ever applied to private
39. IL at 273,794 P.2d at 918,272 Cal. Rptr. at 161. But see id. at 274,794 P.2d at 919-20,
272 Cal. Rptr. at 161-62 (Mosk, L, concurring) (asserting that section 5110.730(a) requires the
writing contain "an express declaration of transmutation").
40. Id at273,794 P.2d at919,272 Cal. Rptr. at 161. Butsee Estate ofWalsh, 66 Cal. App.
2d 704, 707, 152 P.2d 750,752 (1944) (holding a gift of jewelry from a husband to his wife was not
sufficient to transmute the jewelry paid for with community funds). See also Wall v. Wall, 30 Cal.
App. 3d 1042, 1045-46, 106 Cal. Rptr. 690, 692-93 (1973) (holding that separate funds of a wife
deposited in a joint account were transmuted into community property despite absence of intent on
the part of the wife to make a gift to her husband).
41. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d at 272 n.8, 794 P.2d at 918 n.8, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 160 n.8.
Although the court of appeal ruled that the terminable interest rule was inapplicable, Mr. MacDonald
did not challenge the lower court's ruling in his petition for review to the supreme court. let at 266,
794 P.2d at 914, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
42. Id.
43. In the case of pension or other retirement plans, the spouse who is the covered employee
or contributor to the plan is identified as the "participant."
44. In re Marriage of Powers, 218 Cal. App. 3d 626, 634-35, 267 Cal. Rptr. 350, 353 (1990).
See infra notes 330-412 and accompanying text (discussing the terminable interest rule).
45. Estate of MacDonald, 213 Cal. App. 3d 456, 261 Cal. Rptr. 653, 656 (1989).
46. 261 Cal. Rptr. at 656-57. See Estate of Austin, 206 Cal. App. 3d 1249, 1253, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 372, 373-74 (1988) (holding that the terminable interest rule was abolished by Section 2 of
Chapter 686 of Statutes of 1986).
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pension plans, at least where the participant could designate the
death beneficiary.4 7
Many commentators believe that both the court of appeal and
the California Supreme Court failed to consider what may have
been the most important issue in the MacDonald case: Whether,
assuming Mrs. MacDonald's consent to the IRA beneficiary
designations was not a waiver or transmutation of her community
property rights, her consent was sufficient to constitute a gift or
transfer of her community interest in the IRAs, effective upon the
death of Mr. MacDonald. The supreme court's failure to address
this issue leaves many questions unanswered. For example, if the
husband had predeceased the wife, could the wife have revoked her
consent? Also, since the wife died first, is the consent irrevocable
at her death, or is it possible, as in MacDonald, that her personal
representative could revoke the consent after her death?
The consent issue was raised by Mr. MacDonald for the first
time at the supreme court." According to footnote five of the
opinion, the respondent argued that the beneficiary designation
consent contained in the IRA documents was a form of will
substitute regarding the disposition of the IRAs.49 The court stated
that there was no evidence to support the respondent's
contention.5 ° Moreover, Rule 29(b) of the California Rules of
Court does not permit issues to be raised for the first time on
appeal.5 Of perhaps greater significance, footnote eight indicates
that the court was asked to consider whether the wife's consent to
the beneficiary designation constituted a consent to a gift to the
47. MacDonald, 213 Cal. App. 3d 456,261 Cal. Rptr. at 657. See Bowman v. Bowman, 171
Cal. App. 3d 148, 155, 217 Cal. Rptr. 174, 179 (1985) (stating that 'It]he terminable interest rule
was never intended to deprive a nonemployed spouse compensation for his or her spouse's interest
in a pension plan").
48. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d at267 n.5, 794 P.2d at 915 n.5,272 Cal. Rptr. at 157 n.5 (1990).
49. Id
50. Id
51. Id.; CAL. R. Cr. 29(b).
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husband under California Civil Code section 5125(b).52 The court
inferred that respondent's argument would be simply a way of
circumventing the written transmutation rule of section
5110.730(a), 53 but did not squarely address the gift issue. 54
The California Supreme Court probably reached the correct
decision in MacDonald on the issue of transmutation. The wife's
signature on the consent forms merely evidenced her agreement to
the death beneficiary designations and was motivated to a large
extent by her terminal illness. It is difficult to find any written
expression of an intent to transfer (transmute) property rights from
the wife to the husband on the facts presented in MacDonald.
55
However, the court's strict interpretation of the express declaration
requirement of section 5110.730, although probably justified by the
language of the statute,56 imposes an almost impossible burden
upon spouses' abilities to alter and clarify their property rights or
to make gifts to each other without hiring a lawyer to draft an
express declaration. Most laypersons probably believe a
"transmutation" is some form of religious experience, and would
be amazed to learn that they must use that, or similar language, to
make property transfers to their spouses.
There are other problems with the express declaration
requirement of section 5110.730 which were not before the
supreme court and remain undecided. For example, must the
express declaration actually be signed by one or both spouses? The
statute indicates that the declaration must be "made by, joined in,
consented to, or accepted by the spouse adversely affected." 57
What does this language really mean? Who is "adversely affected"
52. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d at 272 n.8, 794 P.2d at 918 n.8, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 160 n.8. See
CAL. CIv. CODE § 5125(b) (West Supp. 1990). Section 5125(b) provides in part that a spouse may
make a gift of community personal property if consented to in writing by the other spouse. Id
53. CAL Civ. CODE § 5110.730(a) (West Supp. 1991).
54. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d at 272 n.8, 794 P.2d at 918 n.8, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 160 n.8.
55. See id at 267 n.4, 794 P.2d at 914 n.4, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 156 n.4. The supreme court could
not even find any evidence in the record that Mrs. MacDonald even knew that she had a community
interest in her husband's pension plan proceeds. Id.
56. CAL Cv. CODE § 5110.730(a) (West Supp. 1991). Subdivision (a) specifically provides
that a transmutation "is not valid unless made in writing by an express declaration . I... d.
57. Id
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under the statute if the spouses transmute community property into
joint tenancy property? In addition, if the transfer agreement
converts property from community property to a tenancy in
common, are both spouses required to agree to, consent to, or
accept the transmutation?
The MacDonald case illustrates the lack of statutory or judicial
authority regarding the impact of the spousal consent rules upon
gifts which take effect at death or upon nonprobate transfers of
property. This Article is intended to address the problems which
arise in the area of spousal transfers and to propose solutions. Part
I of this Article discusses generally interspousal transfers and
transfers to third persons in California under statutory law.58 Part
II summarizes the transmutation rules in other community property
states.59 Part Ill analyzes the application of California Civil Code
section 5110.730 to interspousal transfers after MacDonald.' Part
IV recommends changes in the transmutation rules and proposes
new statutory language.61 Part V discusses special problems which
relate to community property interests in life insurance policies,
death benefit plans, and other forms of will substitutes,62 and Part
VI proposes statutory changes in the spousal consent rules for
transfers of these types of property. 3 This Article concludes that
legislative action is necessary to clarify the transmutation and
spousal consent statutes in order to assure that spouses have equal
rights to transfer community property by gift or at death.'"
I. SPOUSAL TRANSFERS -- GIFT OR TRANSMUTATION?
A. Interspousal Transfers of Community and Separate Property
58. See infra notes 65-146 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 147-192 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 193-222 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 223-248 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 249-416 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 417-460 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 461-463 and accompanying text.
369
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A transmutation of community or separate property can occur
in two ways: by an agreement between the spouses altering their
property rights or by a gift or other transfer of property from one
spouse to the other.' These two methods of transmutation are
recognized by the Uniform Marital Property Act, section 7(b). 66
A transmutation may also result from application of the estoppel
doctrine under some circumstances.67
Since 1872, California law has permitted husbands and wives
to deal with each other with virtually no limitations and clearly
permits them to transmute the character of their property, by
agreement, from community to separate or vice versa.6" However,
California Civil Code section 5125(b) expressly provides that a
spouse may not make a gift of community property, or dispose of
such property without valuable consideration, without the written
consent of the other spouse.69 The question whether section
5125(b) applies to interspousal transfers was undecided prior to
MacDonald.7" The California Supreme Court thought that such an
application might function to circumvent the express declaration
writing requirement of California Civil Code section 5110.730.71
On its face, section 5125(b) is inappropriate when applied to a gift
of community property from one spouse to the other, since the
consent would be made by the donee, not the donor.72 This may
65. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5110.710 (West Supp. 1991).
66. UNIF. MARrrAL Acr § 7(b), 9A U.LA. 117 (1987).
67. See Giacomazzi v. Rowe, 109 Cal. App. 2d 498, 503-04, 240 P.2d 1020, 1023 (1952)
(holding that a wife was estopped from claiming a community interest in property at issue in
dissolution after having stated that she and her husband had no community property).
68. See, e.g., Tompkins v. Bishop, 94 Cal. App. 2d 546,550,211 P.2d 14, 16 (1949) (stating
that statutory law permits spouses to change the character of their property by contract during the
marriage); Fay v. Fay, 165 Cal. 469, 473, 132 P. 1040, 1042 (1913) (stating that husband and wife
are permitted to change by contract the character of their property from community to separate); Title
Ins. and Trust v. Ingersoll, 153 Cal. 1, 5, 94 P. 94, 95 (1908) ("There can be no doubt that a
husband and wife may by contract transmute the separate property of either or both into community
property.").
69. CAL Cv. CODE § 5125(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
70. See Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262,272 n.8,794 P.2d 911,918 n.8,
272 Cal. Rptr. 153, 160 n.8 (1990) (agreeing with the court of appeal that application of § 5125(b)
in the case at bar would circumvent the requirements of § 5110.730).
71. ld.
72. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 5125(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1991) (requiring the consent of the
spouse not making the gift or disposition of community property).
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be why the courts have not applied the written consent rule where
interspousal transfers are involved.73 In fact, until 1985 oral
marital agreements that transmuted the character of both real and
personal property were upheld because consideration was
conclusively presumed to exist in marital agreements.74 Thus,
interspousal gifts of property were valid without satisfying the
requirements of either California Civil Code section 5125 or
section 5127.75 It is likely that neither the legislature nor the
courts think of interspousal transfers as gifts in the management
and control sense, which is the general subject of California Civil
Code section 5125.76
California Civil Code section 5110.730 overruled existing case
law that permitted oral transmutations of personal property, with
certain exceptions for certain gifts not of substantial value.77 In
recommending that the legislature adopt section 5110.730, the
California Law Revision Commission stated that "California
should continue to recognize informal transmutations for certain
personal property gifts between spouses, but should require a
writing for a transmutation of real property or other personal
property.' '78  The legislative history of California Civil Code
73. See Logan v. Thome, 205 Cal. 26, 29, 269 P.2d 626, 627 (1928) (holding that statutory
provision requiring consent of wife for gift made by husband is for wife's "'benefit and protection"
and has no application to case involving gift by husband directly to the wife). See also HOGOBOOM
& KING, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GullE: FAMILY LAW § 8.118-8.124 (1990).
74. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110.730, Legislative Committee Comment (West Supp. 1991).
75. See, e.g, In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853
(1980) (finding that wife was unable to rebut presumption that property purchased with wife's
separate funds was a gift to her husband since title to the property was taken in joint tenancy). See
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5125, 5127 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991) (providing for disposition of marital
property; requiring consent of both spouses to effect gift or transfer of personal or real community
property).
76. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5125 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991). The balance of this Article assumes
a distinction between management and control issues which govern gifts in general, and contract or
transfer issues which control interspousal gifts and transmutation. A key issue discussed in this
Article is the extent to which a consent by a spouse to a gift by the other spouse to a third party also
results in a transmutation of the property in question. See infra notes 81-139 and accompanying text.
77. Commission Report, supra note 34, at 224-25.
78. I& at 214 (emphasis added). But see HoGoBooM & KING, supra note 73, § 8.118 (stating
that, despite the requirements of § 5110.730, "'presumably true gifts can still be proved by evidence
of the ordinary elements of a gift -- delivery and donative intent") (emphasis added).
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section 5110.730 indicates an intent to exempt only certain
interspousal gifts from the express declaration requirement. 79
Thus, under the current code, interspousal gifts of real or non-de
minimis personal property require an express declaration of
transmutation in writing. This is the conclusion reached by the
California Supreme Court in MacDonald.80
B. Gifts of Community Property to Third Persons
Under Spanish rule, a husband acted in effect as a business
manager in exercising management and control over the community
property.8 Thus, a transfer for inadequate consideration would not
be in the best interests of the community and would probably be,
at least if material, invalid.8 2 As an outgrowth of that rule,
California historically provided that a husband could not make a
gift of community property without the consent of his wife. 3
With the advent of equal management and control of
community property, California Civil Code section 5125(b)
originally provided that "[a] spouse may not make a gift of
community personal property or dispose of community personal
property without a valuable consideration."8 " Section 5125(b), as
adopted, seemingly made interspousal gifts absolutely void
regardless of whether both spouses consented to or joined in the
gift and regardless of the existence of a written consent or
agreement.8 ' Prior to January 1, 1975, the written consent of both
spouses was required. 6 The obvious defect in the statutory
79. Commission Report, supra note 34, at 205.
80. Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262, 272, 794 P.2d 911, 918, 272 Cal.
Rptr. 153, 160 (1990).
81. W. DEFuNIAK & M. VAUaHN, PRINCIPLES Op COMMUNlry PROPERTY 203-05 (2d ed.
1971).
82. Id.
83. 1891 CaL Stat. 425, oh. CCXX, § 1.
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language of section 5125(b) was remedied in 1978 by the addition
of the words "without the written consent of the other spouse.
' 87
The interspousal gift statutes do not contain similar language
for community real property, apparently on the assumption that
California Civil Code section 5127, which requires the joinder of
both spouses in any written conveyance or encumbrance of
community real property, supplies the necessary protection.88
California courts have fully protected the nonconsenting spouse's
rights where a gift of real property is concerned. 89 For example,
in Gantner v. Johnson," the First District Court of Appeal held
that the nonconsenting spouse could set aside the gift of real
property in its entirety during her lifetime, despite the language of
the management and control statute relating to transfers of
community property9' indicating that she should have taken some
action within a year after her husband's conveyance was
recorded.' There is no statutory de minimis rule permitting gifts
by one spouse to a third party without the consent of the other.
However, with respect to de minimis transmutations, California
Civil Code section 5110.730(c) provides that an express written
declaration is not required for interspousal gifts of clothing,
wearing apparel, jewelry, or other tangible articles of a personal
nature for the donee spouse's use, that are insubstantial in value in
light of the circumstances of the marriage.93
If one spouse makes a gift of community property without the
consent of the other, the courts have found this to be, at a
minimum, a breach of the donor spouse's fiduciary duties and, at
87. 1977 Cal. Stat. ch. 332 , sec. 4, at 1288; 1977 Cal. Stat. ch. 692, sec. 1, at 2240
(amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125(b)).
88. CA1L CIv. CODE § 5127 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
89. See, e.g., Droeger v. Friedman, 54 Cal. 3d 26, 812 P.2d 931,283 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1991)
(holding transfer of community real property in violation of statute requiring spousal consent may
be invalidated by nonconsenting spouse).
90. 274 Cal. App. 2d 869,79 Cal. Rptr. 381.
91. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 172, 172a (West Supp. 1968) (repealed 1969).
92. Id. at 876,79 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
93. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5110.730(c) (West Supp. 1991).
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worst, a fraud against the other spouse." Gifts made without the
consent of both spouses are voidable, but only by the
nonconsenting spouse.95 The nonconsenting spouse may either set
aside the gift and recover the property or seek reimbursement from
the donor spouse.96 Prior to the adoption of California Civil Code
section 5125.1 in 1986, the nonconsenting spouse could seek
reimbursement from the other spouse only upon the termination of
the community by reason of dissolution or death." California
Civil Code section 5125.1 created a cause of action by one spouse
against the other for breach of the duty imposed by section 5125
and section 5127 with respect to management and control of the
community,98 including making gifts without the consent of both
spouses."
After the marriage has terminated, the nonconsenting spouse
may set aside only one-half of the invalid transfer.'O° Where the
marriage is ended by dissolution, California Civil Code section
4800(b)(2) permits, as an award or offset against the property
division, any sum determined to have been "deliberately
misappropriated" by one spouse to the detriment of the other. 1'
Section 4800(b)(2) could be construed to include unauthorized
gifts.
94. See, e.g., Fields v. Michael, 91 Cal. App. 2d 443, 446-51,205 P.2d 402, 405-08 (1949)
(discussing different theories underlying cause of action to recover community interest in property
which was subject of unauthorized transfer).
95. Spreckels v. Spreckels, 172 Cal. 775, 784, 158 P. 537, 540 (1916).
96. IAL See Trimble v. Trimble, 219 Cal. 340,347,26 P.2d 477,480 (1933) (permitting wife
to set aside one-half of deeds of community property conveyed by decedent husband without consent
of wife).
97. See Harris v. Harris, 57 Cal. 2d 367, 369, 369 P.2d 481, 482, 19 Cal. Rptr. 794, 794
(1962) (stating that ifa wife acts to avoid a gift during the continuance of the community, the whole
gift will be avoided but if the wife acts after the community had been dissolved, she may set aside
the gift as to her one-half community interest).
98. CAL. Civ. CoDE §§ 5125, 5127 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
99. 1&d § 5125.1. An action under § 5125.1 can be brought independently of any action for
dissolution of the marriage, legal separation, or annulment of the marriage. Md. What is not clear from
the statute is the form of relief. For example, if a nonconsenting spouse obtains a money judgment
against the other spouse, how is the judgment paid? Is the judgment satisfied by the donor's "share"
of community property? Or does the judgment constitute separate property of the nonconsenting
spouse? These issues are beyond the scope of this Article.
100. I,
101. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800(b)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
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Where the purported transfer is incomplete, or revocable, the
above-mentioned rules apply." z However, the issue of when the
transfer takes effect becomes important. At common law, a gift
causa mortis was defined as a transfer that takes effect at
death.'0 3 In Odone v. Marzocchi,0 4 the wife transferred cash to
a friend just before the wife entered the hospital. 15 The friend
was instructed to pay the wife's bills and return the money to the
wife if she survived, but if she did not survive, to keep the
money." The wife died eight days later, and her husband sought
to set aside the entire transfer."° The California Supreme Court
held that the wife's transfer of money to her friend was a valid gift
causa mortis and that the husband could recover only one-half of
the transfer. ' At common law, the gift was complete when
made, subject to a condition subsequent, death.' °9
In contrast, California statutory law presently provides that a
"'gift in view of death" takes effect at death."t 0 A gift in view of
death is treated as a legacy for purposes of creditors and
claims."' A "gift in view of death" is defined as a gift of
personal property made in contemplation, fear, or peril of death,
including a gift made during the last illness of the giver. 112 A gift
in view of death is revoked by the donor's recovery from illness or
escape from peril, or the occurrence of any event which would
revoke the donor's intent at the same time."3 A gift in view of
death may also be revoked by the donor during the donor's
102. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text (discussing voidability of transfers of
community property by nonconsenting spouse).
103. See, e.g., Barham v. Khoury, 78 Cal. App. 2d 204,209-10, 177 P.2d 579,582-83 (1947)
(defining "gift causa mortis").
104. 34 Cal. 2d 431, 211 P.2d 297 (1949).
105. A 4 at 434, 211 P.2d at 299.
106. Id at 436-37, 211 P.2d at 299-300.
107. Id at 437, 211 P.2d at 300.
108. Id at 438-39, 211 P.2d at 301.
109. Barham v. Khoury, 78 Cal. App. 2d 204, 210, 177 P.2d 579, 583 (1947).
110. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1149 (West 1982) (defining "gift in view of death").
Ill. Id § 1153 (West 1982).
112. Id § 1149.
113. Id § 1151 (West 1982).
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lifetime."4 Once the property is delivered, however, a bona fide
purchaser is protected." 5 A gift in view of death of community
or quasi-community property is subject to the rights of the donee
spouse."6 If California Civil Code section 5125 applies, both
spouses would have to consent to a gift in view of death for the
transfer to have any effect. 117
The determination of whether a transfer of community property
to a third person is complete when made, or whether it takes effect
only at death, is critical in deciding the impact of a spouse's
consent. If the gift is complete when made and both spouses
consent, neither spouse can set it aside. In contrast, if the gift takes
effect only at death, spouses should retain their community interests
for all purposes since there is no complete transfer. A gift which
takes effect at death is a completed transfer subject to a condition
subsequent, and the consenting spouse may revoke his consent
prior to the donor spouse's death.
A modem version of a gift which takes effect at death is a
revocable transfer of property which becomes a completed gift at
death in the absence of any revocation. A gift made effective at
death is known as an "inchoate gift" or a nontestamentary
disposition.' The California Supreme Court developed the
concept of an "inchoate gift" to characterize revocable transfers
which become complete at death in Travelers' Insurance Co. v.
Fancher."9 On the same day, the court also decided Trimble v.
114. Id.
115. Id. The California Law Revision Commission is currently considering changes in the
statutes pertaining to gifts in view of death. See Cal. L. Rev. Comm'n Staff Memorandum 90-54
(March 20, 1990); Cal. L. Rev. Comm'n Staff Memorandum 90-139, Gifts in New of Death
(November 15, 1990).
116. See Odone v. Marzoechi, 34 Cal. 2d 431,211 P.2d 297 (1949) (finding that husband may
set aside one-half of wife's gift causa mortis of community funds to third party); CA. Civ. CODE
§ 5125 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991) (provision restricting disposition of community personal property).
See also CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 101-02 (West 1991) (provisions relating to ownership and transfer of
quasi-community property after death of spouse).
117. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5125 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
118. In re Adam's Estate, 236 P.2d 418, 419 (1951) (defining gift in view of death). See
Odone, 34 Cal. 2d at 438-39, 211 P.2d 297, 301 (1949).
119. 219 Cal. 351, 26 P.2d 482 (1933) (holding that the designation of a beneficiary in a policy
of life insurance initiates in favor of the beneficiary an inchoate gift of the proceeds of the policy).
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Trimble,120 which involved deathbed gifts of community property
by deed.12' Although the concept of a gift in view of death was
not discussed in either case, the Trimble facts describe a form of
transfer made in view of death."2 Types of transfers made in
view of death include the following: Revocable trusts;
123
revocable beneficiary designations under life insurance
policies; 12  revocable beneficiary designations under employee
benefits plans, such as pension plans, profit sharing plans, and
deferred compensation plans;"z Totten trusts, which are bank
accounts held by one person in trust for another, where the
creator/trustee of the account can revoke the transfer during his or
her lifetime by withdrawing funds from the account and, if no
revocation occurs, the funds pass to the beneficiary at the trustee's
death;126 and various "pay on death" or "transfer at death"
forms of holding title to bank accounts and other property.' 27
Prior to the donor's death, either spouse may revoke an
inchoate transfer.2 If the gift is made to become effective only
upon the donor's death, the consenting donee spouse's death is
irrelevant.'2 9 If the consenting spouse dies first, the donor spouse
is free to revoke the transfer of the donor's community
interest. 3° Following the donor's death, a nonconsenting spouse
120. 219 Cal. 340, 26 P.2d 477 (1933).
121. Id. at 341-42, 26 P.2d at 478.
122. Id.
123. See Katz v. United States, 382 F.2d 723, 725-28 (9th Cir. 1967) (involving revocable
trust).
124. See Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Fancher, 219 Cal. at 352, 26 P.2d at 483 (involving life
insurance policy naming decedent's children as beneficiaries); Blethen v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
198 Cal. 91, 94-95, 243 P. 431, 432-33 (1926) (involving life insurance policy naming decedent's
sister as beneficiary).
125. See Estate of MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262,264-65, 794 P.2d at 911, 913-14,272 Cal. Rptr.
153, 155-56 (1990) (involving pension plan).
126. See Estate of Wilson v. Bowens, 183 Cal. App. 3d 67,69 n.1, 227 Cal. Rptr. 794,795-96,
796, n.1 (1986) (involving Totten trusts created for wife and children of decedent).
127. See IhL
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may only set aside one-half of the gift."' Although it does not,
California Civil Code section 5125(b) should provide that a
consenting spouse's consent is irrevocable upon the donor spouse's
death since the transfer takes effect upon the donor's death.'32
Thus, in MacDonald, had the husband died first, there should have
been no legal basis for the wife to revoke her consent to the
beneficiary designations under the IRAs.
Under present law, consent can be revoked during the donor's
lifetime by the donor, the consenting spouse, or the consenting
spouse's personal representative. 33 However, this view assumes,
as the supreme court in MacDonald did, that the consent was made
conditional upon the donor spouse predeceasing the consenting
spouse.'3 Further, this view assumes that the consenting spouse
intended her consent to be revoked if she predeceased the donor
spouse. Thus, if the consenting spouse predeceases the donor
spouse, her community property interest would pass under the
consenting spouse's will, as did the wife's interest in
MacDonald.13
5
If the consenting spouse predeceases the donor spouse, the
results are not as clear under present law. The result appears to turn
upon when the transfer is effective. If the transfer becomes
effective upon the death of either the consenting spouse or the
donor spouse, whichever is earlier, then neither spouse, nor their
personal representatives, should be able to revoke their consent. If
the consenting spouse's personal representative can revoke the
deceased's consent, as was permitted in MacDonald,136 the
donor's personal representative should have the same right of
revocation, at least as to the donor spouse's community interest, if
the donor spouse dies first. Otherwise, equal treatment of the
spouses would be denied. If MacDonald is carried to its logical
131. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5125.1 (West Supp. 1991).
132. Id. § 5125(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
133. See id § 5110.150(b) (West Supp. 1991) (relating to revocable trusts).
134. Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262, 266,794 P.2d 911, 914, 272 Cal.
Rptr. 153, 156 (1990).
135. d , 51 Cal. 3d at 273, 794 P.2d at 919, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
136. Id.
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conclusion, a transfer of community property can never be effective
at the death of the first spouse.
The donor spouse's revocation of his consent following the
death of the consenting spouse may affect the deceased spouse's
community interest in the object of the transfer. Assuming that the
consenting spouse knew what she was doing in consenting to the
gift, then it must similarly be assumed that the consenting spouse
wanted the property to pass to the designated donee or beneficiary.
Thus, the designation should be irrevocable with regard to the
consenting spouse's community interest in such property following
her death. The MacDonald court failed to make this
assumption.13
7
In summary, a gift intended to take effect at death is generally
treated in the same manner as a gift completed during the donor's
lifetime. 131 If the other spouse does not expressly consent to the
transfer, the nonconsenting spouse may set it aside, but only as to
that spouse's one-half community interest. 139 Where the other
spouse has consented to the transfer, the result is less clear. If the
gift is effective only upon the donor's death, then either spouse
should be able to revoke the transfer during the donor's life. If the
gift is complete to any extent upon the death of either spouse, the
surviving spouse should have no power to set the completed
transfer aside. This conclusion is clearly inconsistent with the
contract rights under life insurance policies, death benefits, and
other forms of beneficiary designations which give one spouse,
generally the owner of the life insurance policy or the participant
in the death benefit plan, the right to change or revoke a
beneficiary designation. If a husband, with his wife's written
consent, names a beneficiary under his community property
insurance policy, the terms of the policy would not preclude him
from changing the beneficiary subsequent to his wife's death.
137. See id. at 266,794 P.2d at 914,272 Cal. Rptr. at 156 (concluding that wife did not intend
to transmute her community interest in IRAs by consenting to beneficiary designations).
138. See supra notes 102-137 and accompanying text.
139. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5125.1.
379
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 23
Regardless of the form of the gift, a transfer which is revocable
until the donor's death is not effective until death.
In MacDonald, the surviving spouse had designated a trust as
the beneficiary to his IRAs. 140 His wife consented to that
designation.' However, upon her death, the California Supreme
Court permitted the wife's executor to revoke that consent. 42 The
issue in MacDonald was whether Mrs. MacDonald had made a
lifetime transfer of her interest in the IRM, as opposed to a
transfer effective at her death.143 If a broad reading of California
Civil Code section 5110.710 is followed, no transfer at death would
be effective unless it met the specific requirements of the
transmutation statutes."4 The weakness of MacDonald is the
supreme court's failure to recognize that Mrs. MacDonald made a
testamentary transfer of her interest in the IRAs by signing the
consent forms, which constituted a satisfactory will substitute, since
it is unlikely that the legislature intended to extend the
transmutation statute to transmutations which take effect at death.
If Mrs. MacDonald's actions had been correctly interpreted as
a testamentary act under any of the various theories discussed, such
as, inchoate gift, nonprobate transfer, or gift in view of death, then
the issue of revocation would have been clear. Mrs. MacDonald's
consent to the beneficiary designation could have been revoked
during her lifetime, just as a will, revocable trust, or beneficiary
designation might have been revoked. Following her death, Mrs.
MacDonald's consent should have become irrevocable. To conclude
otherwise would permit all testamentary and nonprobate transfers
140. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d at 265, 794 P.2d at 913, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
141. Id at 265, 794 P.2d at 914, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 156.
142. Id at 273, 794 P.2d at 919, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
143. Id at 267, 794 P.2d at 915, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
144. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 5110.710 (West Supp. 1991) (providing that married persons may
transmute property, subject to the requirements of §§ 5110.720-5110.740, without consideration by
agreement or transfer); id § 5110.730 (West Supp. 1991) (providing that a transmutation is not valid
unless made "in writing by an express declaration" which is consented to by the adversely affected
spouse). The language of section 5110.710 may be interpreted to apply to all transfers of spousal
property, including transfers at death. If so, these types of transfers would be subject to the
requirements of section 5110.730, as interpreted by the MacDonald decision.
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of property to be revoked after the death of the testator or
transferor.
In the event that a consenting spouse revokes her consent
during her lifetime, the community interest of the consenting
spouse will be distributed at death as if the consent had never been
given. Since the spouse who names the beneficiary or makes the
nonprobate transfer is not required to notify the other spouse of his
action, the consenting spouse should not be required to provide
notice of the revocation of her consent.
The donor spouse's revocation of his beneficiary designation or
nonprobate transfer while both spouses are alive would clearly
revoke the other spouse's consent. The donor spouse's revocation
following the consenting spouse's death would have one of three
possible results.
First, the consenting spouse's consent to the original beneficiary
designation or transfer can be viewed as a waiver, transfer, or
transmutation of that spouse's community interest to or in favor of
the surviving spouse. Thus, any new beneficiary or transferee
would receive the entire benefit, including the predeceased spouse's
community interest.
This approach was rejected by the California Supreme Court in
MacDonald.'45 Absent proof of a lifetime transfer of the
consenting spouse's community interest in the property to the other
spouse, the above-stated alternative does not produce a reasonable
result.
Second, the designation of a new beneficiary or a change in
transferee can be seen as a revocation of the predeceased spouse's
consent. The new beneficiary or transferee would then receive only
the surviving spouse's community interest. The predeceased
spouse's community interest would pass as it would have if
included in the decedent's probate estate.
Although this approach is more attractive than the assumed
waiver or transmutation, it is defective. The implied revocation
145. Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262,272 n.8, 794 P.2d 911,918 n.8, 272
Cal. Rptr. 153, 160 n.8 (1990).
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approach assumes, as the majority of both the court of appeal and
supreme court apparently did in MacDonald, that the consenting
spouse does not really intend to transfer his or her community
interest in the property to the designated beneficiary or
transferee. 46 Assuming that the transferor spouse intended to
transfer his community interest in the property to the transferee or
beneficiary, then, in this era of equal rights and responsibilities, it
should be assumed that the consenting spouse also intended to
transfer her community interest to the same person. If not, all
fons of consent are meaningless.
Third, as with the second alternative, the designation of a new
beneficiary or trustee can be viewed as an automatic revocation of
the predeceased spouse's consent. In contrast, however, the
predeceased spouse's community interest would pass in accordance
with the beneficiary designation or transfer to which the
predeceased spouse consented.
This approach puts the spouses in exactly the same position
they would occupy if they had each ekecuted a will or revocable
trust transferring their respective property intetests to the same
beneficiary. During the joint lifetimes of the spouses, either spouse
may revoke the transfer as to his or her community interest. Should
the transferor spouse change his beneficiary designation, the
consenting spouse would occupy a somewhat better position than
if she had executed a will or revocable trust, since her consent is
automatically revoked by the transferor's change of beneficiary.
Upon the death of either spouse, the deceased spouses' community
interest would be distributed on the basis of the beneficiary
designation which the decedent had made or to which the decedent
had consented. In the absence of consent to a change in
beneficiary, the spouse who was not empowered to name a
beneficiary could make a testamentary disposition of her
community interest.
Given the contractual nature of life insurance and other assets
which may be subject to nonprobate transfers, there appears to be
no way to eliminate the inequality between participating and
146. lML at 272-73, 794 P.2d at 918-19, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 160-61.
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nonparticipating spouses, short of permitting the spouses to
designate a transferee or beneficiary as to each spouse's community
interest in such property, despite the underlying contract rights, or
declaring that spousal consents to such designations are
meaningless. If the transferor spouse's new beneficiary designation
made after the consenting spouse's death is deemed to revoke the
consenting spouse's consent post mortem, the consenting spouse's
share would pass under that spouse's will or by intestate
succession. This approach assumes that the consenting spouse
would not have agreed to the original beneficiary designation
unless the transferor spouse's community interest passed to the
same beneficiary. This approach is subject to the same criticism as
the MacDonald decision, since it assumes that -- to use the facts of
MacDonald -- Mrs. MacDonald did not really intend to pass her
community interest in the IRAs to the beneficiary trust created by
her husband, even though she signed a consent to that effect. It is
dangerous to assume that the deceased spouse would revoke her
consent and shift her interest in the benefit to her heirs at law or
beneficiaries under her will simply because the surviving spouse
decided to change the beneficiary as to his community interest.
I. TRANSMUTATION RULES IN OTHER COMMUNrrY
PROPERTY STATES
Other community property jurisdictions have used both the gift
theory and the written agreement theory to support transmutations
of property. For example, when interspousal gifts are involved,
Texas permits informal or "easy" transmutations.147 Although
there appears to be no statute directly on point, article XVI of the
Texas Constitution, as amended in 1980, grants spouses broad
147. See, e.g., Wohlenberg v. Wohlenberg, 485 $.W.2d 342 (rex. Civ. App. 1972); Hamilton
v. Charles Maund Oldsmobile-Cadillac Co., 347 S.W.2d 944 (rex. Civ. App. 1961); Cauble v.
Beaver-Electra Refining Co., 115 Tex. 1, 274 S.W. 120 (1925); Armstrong v. Turbeville, 216 S.W.
1101 (rex. Civ. App. 1920); Wofford v. Lane, 167 S.W. 180 (rex. Civ. App. 1914); Bruce v. Koch,
40 S.W. 626 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897).
383
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
authority to enter premarital and marital property agreements which
alter their property rights.'48
Texas cases generally recognize transmutation by gift, such as
deeds from one spouse to the other or acts of one spouse indicating
consent or acquiescence to a gift to the other spouse.' 4 9 Most
Texas cases hold that conveyance or delivery is sufficient to
establish a gift if other competent evidence, including testimony as
to statements made, supports this conclusion. 5° For example, in
Robbins v. Robbins,15 1 the husband's informal consent and
acquiescence to his wife's acquisition of real property in her own
name was held sufficient to establish an intent to make a gift to
her.'52 In similar cases, Texas courts have held that the character
of property transferred inter vivos from one spouse to the other is
determined by the nature of the consideration received.5 3
Surrounding circumstances may be used to show that a transfer was
a gift. 5
4
New Mexico, like most other community property states,
including California, recognizes a variety of interspousal
transactions. 155 Interspousal conveyances, at least from husband
to wife, raise a rebuttable presumption of a gift and
transmutation. 56 In Estate of Fletcher v. Jackson,5 7 the Court
of Appeals of New Mexico held that an agreement between spouses
to transmute property from community to joint tenancy does not
148. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
149. See, e.g., McCarver v. Trumble, 660 S.W.2d 595,598 rex. Ct. App. 1983) (holding joint
tenancy recital in deed was sufficient to convert property purchased with separate funds into
community property).
150. See, e.g., Babb v. McGee, 507 S.W.2d 821 (rex. Civ. App. 1974); McFadden v.
McFadden, 213 S.W.2d 71 (rex. Civ. App. 1948); Robbins v. Robbins, 125 S.W.2d 666 rex. Civ.
App. 1939).
151. 125 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
152. Id at 672. Accord Babb 507 S.W.2d at 823; McFadden, 213 S.W.2d at 75.
153. See, e.g., Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569, 575, 342 S.W.2d 565, 569 (1961); Saldana v.
Saldana, 791 S.W.2d 316, 319 (rex. Ct. App. 1990).
154. Babb, 507 S.W.2d at 822-23.
155. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-2 (1978) (providing that spouses may enter into "any
engagement or transaction with the other, or with any other person respecting property, which either
might, if unmarried...").
156. Overton v. Benton, 60 N.M. 348, 349, 291 P.2d 636, 637 (1955).
157. 94 N.M. 572, 613 P.2d 714 (1980).
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necessarily have to be in writing.158 The court indicated that
although New Mexico Statutes Annotated section 40-2-2 does not
expressly require a writing to effect an interspousal transfer of
property, the transmutation must be established by clear, strong,
and convincing proof -- more than a mere preponderance of
evidence.159 However, the requisite level of proof need not be
established by an express written instrument."0 The court reached
its conclusion despite a New Mexico statute which defines separate
property as property designated to be separate by a written
agreement between the spouses. 
161
Nevada follows the written agreement rule.' 62 Transfers of
community property, from husband to wife, without a specific
written agreement, give rise to a rebuttable presumption of gift. 63
However, in a recent case, Verheyden v. Verheyden,164 the
Nevada Supreme Court indicated that a mere oral expression of a
gift between spouses does not satisfy the clear and convincing
proof requirement necessary to overcome the community
presumption. 65 In Campbell v. Campbell, the wife made a
down payment from her separate funds on a house held in joint
tenancy. 167 The supreme court presumed that the down payment
was a gift, despite the absence of an express written
instrument. 16  Finally, in Hopper v. Hopper,19 the wife's use
158. l1 at 579, 613 P.2d at 721.
159. Ied at 574-75, 613 P.2d at 716-17 (quoting In re Trimble's Estate, 57 N.M. 51, 56, 253
P.2d 805, 808 (1953)).
160. Id. at 575-76, 613 P.2d at 717-18.
161. Id at579-80, 613 P.2d at721-22; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-8(A)(5) (1978). See Comment,
Community Property - Transmutation of Community Property: A Preference for Joint Tenancy in
New Mexico?, 11 N.M. L. REv. 421 (1980) (discussing Estate of Fletcher).
162. See NEv. REv. STAT. § 123.220 (1986 & Supp. 1991) (defining community property).
163. Peters v. Peters, 92 Nev. 687, 691,557 P.2d 713,715 (1976); Todkiil v. Todkill, 88 Nev.
231, 237-38, 495 P.2d 629, 632 (1972).
164. 104 Nev. 342, 757 P.2d 1328 (1988).
165. Ikd at 346, 757 P.2d at 1331.
166. 101 Nev. 380, 705'P.2d 154 (1985).
167. Id. at 382, 705 P.2d at 155.
168. Id. See Graham v. Graham, 104 Nev. 472, 474, 760 P.2d 772, 773 (1988) (holding
quitclaim deed in favor of joint tenancy was sufficient to convert husband's separate property into
community property and that husband failed to overcome presumption that quitclaim deed constituted
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of her own separate funds to pay for improvements on a home,
which was the separate property of her husband, was also presumed
to be a gift.170
In Idaho, property conveyed from one spouse to the other is
presumed to be separate property. 17' Additionally, marriage
settlement agreements must be formally executed.' 72 Case law
indicates that the same formalities followed with respect to
settlement agreements must be followed to transmute property.1
7 3
Washington has similar statutes governing marital agreements
which cover conveyances of real estate between husband and wife
and agreements as to the status of property, and which require that
these agreements be executed with due formality. 74 However,
case law indicates that transmutation may be effected by deed or
by an agreement between the parties.'75 The character of property
cannot be changed by oral agreement alone since the statute of
frauds applies.1 76 However, as in most community property states,
a conveyance from one spouse to the other will give rise to a
presumption of gift. 1
77
In 1895, the Washington Supreme Court held that real property
conveyed to a wife by a third party was presumed to be the
separate property of the wife despite extrinsic evidence which
indicated that her husband intended the property to be a wedding
an interspousal gift).
169. 80 Nev. 302, 392 P.2d 629 (1964).
170. Id at 302-03 392 P.2d at 629.
171. IDAHO COD § 33-906 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
172. Id §§ 32.916, 32.919 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
173. See, e.g., Stockdale v. Stockdale, 102 Idaho 870,643 P.2d 82, 85 (1982) (holding that the
separate or community character of real property may be altered only in the manner provided or
permitted by statute).
174. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.16.050, 26.16.120 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991).
175. See, e.g., Volz v. Zang, 113 Wash. 378, 194 P. 409 (1920).
176. See Rogers v. Joughlin, 152 Wash. 448,277 P. 988,991 (1929) (holding that the character
of property cannot be changed from separate to community property or from community to separate
property by the oral agreement of spouses alone). See also Churchill v. Stephenson, 14 Wash. 620,
45 P. 28, 29 (1886) (holding that a parol agreement of the husband to convey to the wife community
real property was within the statute of frauds and was therefore void).
177. Denny v. Schwabacher, 54 Wash. 689, 104 P. 137, 138 (1909).
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anniversary present."7 8 However, in In re Parker's Estate,79 a
husband's direction that title to newly purchased real estate be
placed in the sole name of his wife was held to be an invalid oral
gift. 1
80
Arizona cases recognize transmutation by conveyance plus
evidence of contemporaneous conduct. 8' However, some
transmutation is permitted with little formality. In Jones v.
Rigdon,'82 the Arizona Supreme Court stated the following:
Ordinarily, such a gift is evidenced by a conveyance from one to the
other, but that is not the only method by which it is established. The
fact husband causes or permits a conveyance to be made to his wife
tends to show it was the intention of the parties the property should be
her separate estate... [aInd extrinsic evidence, including the testimony
of witnesses, is admissible on this point.
183
Wisconsin's Uniform Marital Property Act permits alteration of
property rights by a "marital property agreement.' "i 4 Wisconsin
law also provides that spouses may reclassify their property by gift,
conveyance signed by both spouses, marital property agreement,
written consent or, in some cases, unilateral statements. 8 5 A
marital property agreement must be signed by both spouses and
include definitions of rights in property.' 6 The agreement is
enforceable without consideration.8 7  The written consent
178. Nixon v. Post, 13 Wash. 181, 43 P. 23, 24-25 (1895).
179. 115 Wash. 57, 196 P. 632 (1921).
180. 196 P. at 633.
181. Estate of Sims v. Hanrahan, 13 Ariz. App. 215, 217, 475 P.2d 505, 507 (1970) (citing
Jones v. Rigdon, 32 Ariz. 286,289, 257 P. 639, 640 (1927)). See, e.g., Noble v. Noble, 26 Ariz. 89,
93-94, 546 P.2d 358, 362-63 (1976) (permitting evidence of both spouse's conduct to prove that
parties intended property purchased with separate funds to be community property).
182. 32 Ariz. 286, 257 P. 639.
183. l at 289, 257 P. at 640.
184. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.17 (West 1990).
185. See, e.g., Schumacher v. Schumacher, 131 Wisc. 332,388 N.W.2d 912 (1986) (involving
marital property agreement). A unilateral statement refers to preservation of income from separate
property. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.59 (West 1990).
186. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.58 (West 1990).
187. Id § 766.58(1) (West 1990).
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provision of the Uniform Marital Property Act applies specifically
to life insurance.' Legislative Council Notes indicate that the
Wisconsin Legislature rejected broader language in the uniform law
which would have allowed a written consent to substitute for a
marital property agreement.""
In summary, although a majority of other community property
jurisdictions require some form of a writing for transmutation, in
many circumstances most courts seem to discount this requirement
if the evidence indicates an intent to transmute and an
acceptance."9 The writing which is sufficient in many cases is
relatively informal and certainly is not required to include an
"express declaration" for a transmutation of the property. 191 In
comparison, California -- once considered to have the easiest
transmutation rules -- now has the most difficult."9
Ill. APPLICATION OF SECTION 5110.730 AFTER MACDONALD
The adoption of the written transmutation rules in 1985,193 as
interpreted by the MacDonald case, 94 signaled the end of easy
transmutations. Extrinsic evidence of gift or intent to transfer could
no longer be relied upon to prove an intent to transmute
property. 9 However, the implications of the express declaration
statute may not have been fully appreciated when it was proposed
and adopted. The legislative history of California Civil Code
section 5110.730 focuses on the need to eliminate the use of oral
188. Id § 76 6.6 1(3)(c) (West 1990).
189. Id § 766.61, Legislative Council Committee Notes (West 1990).
190. See supra notes 147-189 and accompanying text (discussing Texas, New Mexico, Nevada,
Idaho, Washington, Arizona, and Wisconsin community property laws).
191. See, e.g., Graham v. Graham, 104 Nev. 473, 474, 760 P.2d 772, 773 (1988) (holding
quitelaim deed in favor of joint tenancy was sufficient to convert husband's separate property into
community property and that husband failed to overcome presumption that quitclaim deed constituted
an interspousal gift).
192. See W.S. MCCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY PRoPERTY IN "mE UNrTE STATES (1982)
(summarizing the treatment of interspousal transfers during marriage in community property states).
193. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 5110.710-5110.740 (West Supp. 1991).
194. 51 Cal. 3d 262,794 P.2d 911,272 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1990).
195. See id at 272-73, 794 P.2d at 918-19, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 160-61 (stating that holding
effects intent of legislature to enable courts to validate transmutations without resort to extrinsic
evidence for various policy reasons).
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evidence to prove interspousal agreements, but fails to address
informal interspousal transfer and gifts. 96
The written transmutation rule, as interpreted by MacDonald,
directly conflicts with various title presumptions. For example, if
community funds are used to acquire a personal residence and title
is taken as joint tenants, MacDonald suggests that the joint tenancy
title is invalid unless the transaction is accompanied by an express
written declaration recharacterizing the community as joint tenancy
property. 97
The use of separate funds to maintain or improve community
property, once rather easily classified as "gifts to the community"
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, now requires evidence
of an intent to recharacterize the funds so used.' 9 In the absence
of any intent to transmute, the contributing spouse has a right of
reimbursement or possibly a separate interest in the community
property which is the subject of the improvement.'" Did the
California Legislature really intend to limit informal interspousal
transfers to this extent? Consider Estate of Annstrong,2°° where
the wife used community funds to satisfy a lien on her husband's
separate property.20 ' The Second District Court of Appeal
presumed that the wife made a gift of her community interest in
the funds to her husband, thereby transmuting those community
funds into his separate property.2" In In re LaBelle's Estate,
2 3
the wife was aware that her husband was using community funds
196. See Commission Report, supra note 34, at 224-25.
197. Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262, 272, 794 P.2d 911, 918, 272 Cal.
Rptr. 153, 160 (1990). See Estate of Blair, 199 Cal. App. 3d 161, 244 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1988)
(examining the reverse issue of transmutation from joint tenancy to community property).
198. See MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d at 272, 794 P.2d at 918, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 160 (stating that
transmutation writing must contain language which -expressly states that the characterization or
ownership of the property is being changed").
199. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.2 (West Supp. 1991).
200. 241 Cal. App. 2d 1, 50 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1966).
201. Id. at 4-5, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
202. Id. at 8-10, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
203. 93 Cal. App. 2d 538, 209 P.2d 432 (1949).
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to improve his separate property, yet took no action.2° A gift
was presumed by the First District Court of Appeal.
20 5
In both Armstrong and LaBelle, there apparently was no express
written declaration "which expressly states that the characterization
...of the property is being changed. ' ' 201 In fact, there was no
written documentation of any kind in LaBelle. 7 A finding of a
right of reimbursement of a contributing spouse or, in some cases,
a right to apportionment of interests in the property itself, may
result in more litigation, rather than less.2"' If a spouse can prove
that separate funds were used to improve community property,
there is no informal transmutation resulting from an implied gift.
The same applies to the use of community funds by one spouse to
improve or maintain the separate property of the other spouse.
Often, the only written declaration as to the status of
community property is the joint tenancy deed itself. The joint
tenancy deed is not signed by the grantee spouse. However,
California Civil Code section 5110.730 does not expressly require
either spouse to sign the written declaration. 9 The grantee
spouse need only join in, consent to, or accept the declaration." 0
Professor Reppy suggests that the "consented to or accepted by"
language of section 5110.730 does not require a signature by the
spouse adversely affected.2" For example, a deed prepared upon
the husband's insistence, which characterizes property as his wife's
separate property, effectively transmutes the community funds used
204. Id. at 544-45, 209 P.2d at 436.
205. Id. at 545, 209 P.2d at 436.
206. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d at 272, 794 P.2d at 918, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 160. See Armstrong,
241 Cal. App. 2d at 8-9, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 344 (property at issue acquired through settlement
agreement and inheritance); LaBelle, 93 Cal. App. 2d at 539-40,209 P.2d at 433-34 (property at issue
was reputation and good will associated with husband's separate business real property).
207. LaBelle, 93 Cal. App. 2d at 543, 209 P.2d at 435.
208. See In re Marriage of Warren, 28 Cal. App. 3d 777, 780-83, 104 Cal. Rptr. 860, 862-64
(1972) (defining a right of reimbursement where no gift was made). See also In re Marriage of
Gowdy, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1228, 1234,224 Cal. Rptr. 400,404 (1986) (finding that where there was
no gift, the use of community funds to pay encumbrances on husband's separate property gave the
community a proportionate interest in that property).
209. CA. Civ. CODE § 5110.730(a).
210. Id.
211. W. REPPY, supra note 5, at 52.
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to pay for that property into the wife's separate property.21 2
However, the Legislative Committee Comment to California Civil
Code section 5110.730 indicates that, with respect to transmutation
of real property, the new statutory provision complies with the
statute of frauds under California Civil Code sections 1091 and
1624 in requiring that the writing be signed by the transferor or
party to be charged.213 Professor Reppy also argues that
acceptance of a deed which recharacterizes property is a
transmutation under the statute.214 However, the mere fact that a
deed or document of title is mailed to the spouses, who probably
do not even look at it, is hardly evidence that they accepted or
consented to a transmutation, even if the title document contains
language which could be construed as an express declaration under
section 5110.730(a). Consent or acceptance requires some
affirmative action by one or both spouses. Again, the problems of
proof in this instance may be greater than under the easy
transmutation rules.
The written transmutation rule also appears to conflict with
several other California Civil Code sections.215 For example,
section 683 provides that a joint interest is created by a spousal
transfer of property which expressly declares the transfer to be a
joint tenancy.216 Section 683 also provides that a joint tenancy in
personal property may be created by a written transfer, instrument,
or agreement.217 Thus, section 683 is consistent with the express
declaration requirement of section 5110.730 only if it is assumed
that both sections require that each spouse consent to, join in,
make, or agree to the transfer.
The express written declaration requirement may also be in
conflict with California Civil Code section 4800.1, which provides
212. Id
213. California Law Revision Comm'n, Communication of Law Revision Commission
Concerning Assembly Bill 2274, 18 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP. 67,68 (1986); CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 1091 (West 1982); id. § 1624 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
214. W. REPPY, supra note 5, at 52.
215. See, e.g., statutes cited infra notes 216-220.
216. CAL. CiV. CODE § 683(a) (West Supp. 1991).
217. IM.
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that for marital dissolution purposes, titles held in joint tenancy,
tenancy by the entirety, or tenancy in common are presumed to be
community property absent a contrary statement in the document
of conveyance or a written agreement that the property is
separate.218 In effect, section 4800.1 creates an automatic
transmutation for purposes of marital dissolution where separate
funds were used to acquire property held in joint tenancy or other
forms of joint title, with no express written declaration
requirement.219 However, if the document creating the joint
tenancy or tenancy in common does not contain an express
declaration of characterization, the transfer does not satisfy the
express written declaration requirement of section 5110.730(a), and
California Civil Code section 4800.1 is inapplicable. 220
Additionally, California Probate Code section 5305, which
provides that various forms of joint accounts between husband and
wife are presumptively community property, is inconsistent with a
requirement of an express declaration of transmutation of the funds
used to create such an account or to make additional deposits to the
account." The community presumption can be overcome in the
absence of an express declaration of transmutation by a tracing of
the separate funds or by a separate written agreement providing
that the funds are not community property. 2  Although these
exceptions are reasonably consistent with the express declaration
requirement of California Civil Code section 5110.730(a), the basic
community presumption is not. The following section recommends
changes in the transmutation rules and proposes new statutory
language to resolve the above-discussed conflicts between section
5110.730 and other California Civil Code and Probate Code
sections.
218. Id § 4800.1(b) (West 1983).
219. See id (providing that for purposes of division of property upon dissolution, "property
acquired by the parties during the marriage in joint form . . . is presumed to be community
property.").
220. See id § 5110.730(a) (requiring an express written declaration to effect transmutation);
id § 4800.1.
221. CAL PROB. CODE § 5305 (West 1991).
222. Id § 5305(b) (West 1991).
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IV. REVISING THE TRANSMUTATION RULES
Strict adherence to the express declaration requirement of
California Civil Code section 5110.730, as interpreted in
MacDonaldp3 will result in the invalidation of many title
documents for which the spouses have not executed documents
with appropriate language of transmutation. To avoid such a result,
the transmutation statute should be clarified regarding the form of
the declaration required for a transmutation. The statute should also
be coordinated with all other presumptions, including the title
presumption set forth in the previous section.224 As in other
community property jurisdictions, there should be at least some
distinction between marital property agreements and interspousal
gifts. The following recommendations and proposed new statutory
language attempt to better balance the legislature's intent to
eliminate California's easy oral transmutation rule with the harsh
consequences of California Civil Code section 5110.730 as
interpreted by MacDonald.
A. Recommendations for Change
The recommendations for change in the transmutation rules are
based on a general assumption that it should not be more difficult
for husbands and wives to enter agreements with each other or
transfer property to each other than it is for unmarried persons. At
the same time, it is recognized that the nature of the marital
relationship makes it difficult to prove such transfers have occurred
without some degree of formality. The best way to accomplish
these goals is to require some written evidence of transmutation,
whether by agreement or gift.
First, the language of the transmutation statute, with regard to
premarital and marital property agreements, should be coordinated
223. Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262, 794 P.2d 911, 272 Cal. Rptr. 153
(1990).
224. See supra notes 197-222 and accompanying text (discussing joint title presumptions).
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and cross-referenced with other California Civil Code and Probate
Code provisions.'
Second, the transmutation rules should, in the case of premarital
and marital property agreements, eliminate the present language of
California Civil Code section 5110.730(a) which requires an
express declaration in favor of an express reference to such
agreements.
Third, as in many other community property states,
226
California Civil Code section 5110.730 should include any
interspousal transfer of property, including gifts, within the specific
scope of transmutation.
Fourth, the statute should require a signed writing which
complies with the statute of frauds.227 The statute should provide
that in the event of a gift or other transfer, the writing must be
signed by either the transferor spouse or the spouse adversely
affected by the transfer. In the case of interspousal agreements, the
statute should require that both spouses sign the agreement. The
signature requirement would apply to both sales and gifts of
property from one spouse to the other where there is no formal
agreement.
Finally, certain presumptions should be adopted to discourage
litigation. First, where one spouse executes a deed or document of
title naming the other spouse as sole owner of the property or sole
owner of an interest in the property, such as a life estate or tenancy
in common, a transmutation by gift should be presumed. 228 A
presumption of gift satisfies the legislative intent of section
5110.730 to require written documentation. 229 The transmutation
225. See supra notes 215-222 and accompanying text (discussing conflict between section
5110.730 and other Civil Code and Probate Code provisions).
226. See supra notes 147-189 and accompanying text (discussing transmutation rules in other
community property states).
227. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1091 (Vest 1982) (requiring a writing for transfer of real estate);
id. § 1624 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991) (codifying the statute of frauds).
228. See W. Reppy, Debt Collection from Married Californians: Problems Caused by
Transmutations, Single-Spouse Managemen4 and Invalid Marriage, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 143, 162
(1981) (stating that prior to the adoption of CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110.730, a gift would have been
presumed).
229. See Commission Report, supra note 34, at 224-25.
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presumption could be overcome with extrinsic evidence of the
transferor's contrary intent. Second, any writing signed by the
transferor which uses the words "gift" or "give" in connection
with the delivery of property from one spouse to another should
give rise to a presumption of gift and constitute a transmutation.
The above proposed changes would produce a less formal
transmutation statute which expressly covers premarital agreements,
marital property agreements, and interspousal transfers. A writing
would be required, but not an express declaration. The writing
requirement would trigger the parol evidence rule, which limits the
admissibility of extrinsic evidence to prove the effect of the
writing.2
30
Moreover, these proposed changes to the transmutation rules
would have a minimal impact upon the rights of creditors. The pre-
1985 easy transmutation rules permitted the use or oral testimony,
often totally unsubstantiated, to establish a transmutation of real or
personal property from community to separate or separate to
231
community that was often detrimental to creditors. In contrast,
the present version of the express declaration statute provides that
a transmutation of real property is not effective as to third parties
without notice unless such transmutation is recorded.232 Creditors
are further protected under California Civil Code section 5110.720
from a transmutation of property which would be a fraudulent
transfer under any applicable law. 1 3 The adoption of a more
lenient statute of frauds test will not change that result, unless
California Civil Code section 5110.730(b) is repealed or amended.
Such an alteration is not suggested herein. While a recorded
conveyance of real property between spouses could be
characterized as a transmutation with the aid of extrinsic evidence,
the change in the form of title should be sufficient to put creditors
395
230. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1091 (West 1982); i. § 1624 (West 1985 & Supp.).
231. See Commission Report, supra note 34, at 224-25.
232. CAL Civ. CODE § 5110.730(b) (West Supp. 1991).
233. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5110.720.
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on notice. An additional requirement of an express declaration in
writing is unnecessary.
With regard to personal property, the requirement of a writing
which satisfies the statute of frauds instead of an express written
declaration does not alter the application of California Civil Code
section 3440, which conclusively presumes that a transfer without
delivery is fraudulent as to the transferor's creditors.234 However,
even if there is clearly a delivery and change of possession of
personal property, the express declaration requirement under
existing law allows a transferor's creditors to prove that there was
no transmutation, despite evidence to the contrary.
In contrast, a writing short of an express declaration permits the
introduction of extrinsic evidence. For example, assume a husband
makes an assignment in blank of a community property stock
certificate and delivers the certificate to his wife. His wife places
the certificate in a safe deposit box which is maintained in her
name alone. Under the proposed revisions, the husband's signature
on the certificate might be a sufficient writing to permit extrinsic
evidence of delivery and change of possession to prove a
completed gift and transmutation of the certificate to the separate
property of the wife. A creditor would then have to prove that there
was no intent to transfer or, in other words, that the husband
wanted wife to assume full management of the securities in
question, but did not intend to make a gift. Under present law,
there would be no express declaration in writing to effectuate a
transmutation in this hypothetical.
The unrealistic requirements of change of possession and
delivery in the context of a marriage provide creditors more
protection than they are entitled. The issue is even more
complicated where the gift involves the conversion of separate
personal property of one spouse to community property, since
delivery is often lacking. For example, if a husband transmutes an
inherited work of art into community property, the art will in all
probability continue to hang on the wall of the family home. In this
234. Ied § 3440 (West 1970 & Supp. 1991).
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case, the requirement of a writing does afford protection to
creditors.
With respect to premarital and marital property agreements
between spouses, the changes proposed below seek only to clarify
the relationship between these agreements and the transmutation
statute. In virtually every case, any transmutation which results
from the provisions of premarital and martial property agreements
would constitute express declarations in writing signed by both
spouses. Hence, creditors and any other interested persons should
be in no better or worse position under the proposed changes than
under present law.
B. Proposed Statutory Language for Transmutations
The recommendations stated above can be implemented by the
following statutory changes.
First, the following subdivision (h) would be added to
California Civil Code section 1624:235
(h) Marital agreements, including marital property agreements and
premarital agreements as defined in Title 11 of this Code. The effect of
this addition would be to require that all marital agreements, regardless
of their subject matter, be written. A writing requirement would
eliminate the problems inherent in establishing a transmutation solely on
the basis of oral testimony.
Second, section 5201(a) of the California Civil Code?36 would
be amended to read as follows:
(a) The property rights of husband and wife prescribed by statute may
be altered by a premarital agreement which meets the requirements of
Chapter 2 of this Title or other marital property agreement.
235. 1, § 1624 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
236. 1d § 5201(a) (West Supp. 1991).
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This proposed amendment would cross-reference the Uniform
Premarital Agreement ActF37 for clarification.
Third, a new section 5204 would be added to the California
Civil Code as follows:
A "marital property agreement" means an agreement in writing, signed
by both parties, with or without consideration, which relates to the
rights and obligations of the parties in any of the property of either or
both of them, whenever and wherever acquired or located.
This proposed provision conforms to the language of California
Civil Code section 5312(a)(1), which relates to premarital
agreements.2 3
8
Fourth, a new section 5205 would be added to the California
Civil Code as follows:
For purposes of marital property agreements, "property" means an interest,
present or future, legal or equitable, tangible or intangible, vested or
contingent, in real or personal property, including present or future income
from the property and present and future earnings of the spouses.
This definition of property is based on the premarital agreement
language of California Civil Code section 5310(b),2 39 but is
broadened to specifically cover intangible property and future
earnings. A new section 5205 would provide additional flexibility
in planning by the spouses, particularly as to future income.
However, the tax consequences of these marital agreements are
unclear.
Fifth, a new section 5206 would be added to the California
Civil Code as follows:
A marital property agreement may be amended or revoked only by a
written agreement signed by the parties. The amended agreement or
revocation is enforceable without consideration.
237. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 5300-17 (West Supp. 1991).
238. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5312(a)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
239. Id § 5310(b) (West Supp. 1991).
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This proposed provision follows the language of California Civil
Code section 5314 pertaining to premarital agreements.2"
Sixth, a new California Civil Code section 5206 would be
added as follows:
Premarital agreements and marital property agreements may alter or
transmute the property rights of the parties as provided in California
Civil Code section 5110.710, subject to the provisions of Sections
5110.720 and 5110.740, inclusive.
It must be clear which statute controls transmutations. While
marital agreements can transmute property, they should be subject
to the additional requirements of the specific transmutation
provisions.
Seventh, California Civil Code section 5203241 would be
amended to read as follows:
Nothing in this chapter or Chapter 2 of this title affects the validity or
effect of premarital agreements made before January 1, 1986, and the
validity and effect of those agreements shall continue to be determined
by the law applicable to the agreements prior to January 1, 1986.
This proposed change simply restates the present section but adds
the missing reference to Chapter 2.2 A similar provision
probably should be added for the changes made to both premarital
and marital property agreements under these proposals.
Eighth, the following subsection (d) would be added to
California Civil Code section 5110.710:243
(d) As used herein, "property" means an interest, present or future,
tangible or intangible, vested or contingent, in real or personal property,
including present or future income from property and present or future
earnings.
240. Id § 5314 (West Supp. 1991).
241. Id § 5203 (West Supp. 1991).
242. Id §§ 5300-17 (West Supp. 1991).
243. Id § 5110.710.
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This proposed addition broadens the definition of property for
reasons previously outlined.'"
Ninth, California Civil Code section 5110.730(a)245 would be
amended to read as follows:
(a) A transmutation of real or personal property is not valid unless (1)
pursuant to a premarital agreement or a marital property agreement
described in Title 11, or (2) pursuant to an instrument, note, or
memorandum in writing evidencing an intent to transfer, to consent to
the transfer, or to waive a property right, signed by the transferor
spouse or the spouse whose property interests would be adversely
affected by the transmutation. For purposes of determining the nature
and effect of such written instruments, notes, or memoranda, extrinsic
evidence may be admitted to the extent not inconsistent with the express
written provisions. If the writing is a deed or other document of title
executed by one spouse naming the other spouse as sole owner of the
subject property, co-owner of the property with a person or persons
other than the grantor, or owner of a limited interest in the property,
such as a life estate, this is presumed to be a transfer to the transferee
spouse which transmutes the property or interest in the property to the
transferee's separate property. The transfer of real or personal property
from one spouse to the other accompanied by a writing signed by the
transferor in which the transferor indicates an intent to make a gift to
the donee spouse shall be presumed a gift which transmuted the
property to the separate property of the transferee spouse. These are
presumptions affecting the burden of proof.
This language would overrule MacDonald24 by eliminating the
"express declaration" language. Moreover, the proposed
amendment would expressly apply to premarital and marital
property agreements. The written evidence of a transmutation
would have to be signed by both spouses, if pursuant to an
agreement. In the event of a gift or other transfer, the transmutation
writing would have to be signed by the spouse adversely affected
by such gift or transfer. Additionally, the writing would be required
244. See supra note 226 and accompanying text (discussing recommendation for expanding
definition of property).
245. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 5110.730(a).
246. 51 Cal. 3d 262, 794 P.2d 911, 272 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1990).
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to satisfy the statute of frauds. The proposed statute provides a
presumption of transmutation where there is an 'express title
transfer or asset transfer accompanied by a writing which indicates
an intent to make a gift. If the transmutation is not clear on the
face of the writing, extrinsic evidence would be admissible.
The proposed revision to section 5110.730 is inconsistent with
the joint title presumptions previously discussed.247 If it is
desirous to preserve those presumptions, the following language
would have siich a result:
Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, if title to property is held in
a form of ownership specified in Civil Code Sections 4800.1 or 4800.2,
or in an account specified in Probate Code Section 5305, the rules and
presumptions of those provisions will be fully applicable. Further, if title
to real or personal property is held in joint tenancy in accordance with
Civil Code Section 683, it shall pass by right of survivorship to a
surviving joint tenant or joint tenants.
Section 5110.730(a), as revised, potentially varies the
requirements for a contract or agreement between spouses. Thus,
the amended statute should not be applied retroactively. Although
an amended section 5110.730(a) would not interfere with existing
contracts which meet the more stringent standard of the express
written declaration, the amendment could have the effect of making
an informal transfer that does not otherwise meet the express
declaration requirements a completed transmutation, thereby
altering existing property rights.
Finally, the following language should be added to California
Civil Code section 5110.730:248
To the extent property rights which are the subject of transmutation
under these provisions include rights of a surviving spouse described in
Probate Code section 141, the validity of any agreement, transfer, or
waiver of such rights shall be determined under the provisions of
Probate Code sections 140-47.
247. See supra notes 197-222 and accompanying text (discussing joint title presumptions).
248. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5110.730.
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This proposed addition would clarify the controlling statute with
regard to transmutation at death caused by a surviving spouse's
waiver of property rights.
V. COMMUNrrY PROPERTY INTERESTS IN LIFE INSURANCE,
DEATH BENEFITs, AND OTHER WILL SUBSTUTES
The lack of statutory or judicial authority regarding the impact
of spousal consent rules upon gifts effective at death or nonprobate
transfers of property is especially problematic with respect to life
insurance policies, death benefit plans, and other forms of will
substitutes. These problems are discussed below.
A. Life Insurance Policies
Life insurance policies, like any other property, are community
property if acquired with community property during marriage. 2 9
This principle is illustrated by Prudential Insurance Co. v.
Harrison0 and Manufacturer's Life v. Moore." In these two
cases, the claimants killed their spouses." The claimants were
each the intended beneficiary of an insurance policy on the life of
their respective spouses." The policies were paid for with
community funds."4 In both cases, although the claimants were
precluded from profiting from their wrongful acts, each surviving
spouse nevertheless was held to have a one-half community interest
249. See Estate of Mendenhall, 182 Cal. App. 2d 441, 447, 6 Cal. Rptr. 45, 47-48 (1960)
(concluding that for California inheritance tax purposes, a life insurance policy is community property
and the predeceased, nonparticipant spouse's community interest in the policy was subject to
inheritance tax). See also Scott v. Comm., 374 F.2d 154, 159 (9h Cir. 1967) (stating that a spouse's
community interest in the participant spouse's life insurance policy is in the contract, and not just the
right to receive the cash surrender value of such policy); United States v. Stewart, 270 F.2d 894, 898
(9th Cir. 1959) (affirming the trial court's conclusion that husband's insurance policies were
community property since premiums were paid with community funds, unless the wife subsequently
released her interest, converting it into the separate property of her husband).
250. 106 F. Supp. 419 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
251. 116 F. Supp. 171 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
252. Harrison, 106 F. Supp. at 421; Moore, 116 F. Supp. at 173.
253. Harrison, 106 F. Supp. at 421; Moore, 116 F. Supp. at 173.
254. Harrison, 106 F. Supp. at 426; Moore, 116 F. Supp. at 176.
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in the deceased spouse's policy." In Harrison, the spouse was
allowed to collect one-half of the proceeds, while in Moore the
spouse was limited to one-half of the cash surrender valueY
The issue of the community rights of spouses in life insurance
policies has also arisen in the context of simultaneous death5 7
The statutory presumption is that where the insured and the
beneficiary of the policy die simultaneously, the beneficiary is
presumed to have died first."' However, where the insured and
beneficiary are spouses, and the policy is community property, the
proceeds are distributed as community property, despite the
presumption.29
Employee group life insurance also presents some troubling
issues. For example, In re Marriage of Lorenz 6° held that an
employee's rights under an employer-sponsored group term life
insurance policy were not subject to division as part of a marital
dissolution.26 ' In contrast, In re Marriage of Gonzalei62
suggested that Lorenz excluded employee group term life insurance
from the division on the ground that the policy had no
ascertainable value, not because the policy was not community
property.263 In re Estate of Logan - excluded employee group
term life insurance from the division on the no value theory.6 5
However, the result in Logan was limited to situations where the
employee was still insurable.26
255. Harrison, 106 F. Supp. at 426; Moore, 116 F. Supp. at 177.
256. Harrison, 106 F. Supp. at 426; Moore, 116 F. Supp. at 177.
257. See, e.g., In re Estate of Sugino v. Flournoy, 267 Cal. App. 2d 591, 73 Cal. Rptr. 150
(1968); Estate of Hudson, 158 Cal. App. 2d 385, 322 P.2d 987 (1958).
258. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 224 (West 1991). Section 224 does not apply if there is an
alternate beneficiary other than the estate or personal representative of the insured. IeL
259. See In re Wedemeyer's Estate, 109 Cal. App. 2d 67, 71, 240 P.2d 8, 11 (1952); In re
Castagnola's Estate, 68 Cal. App. 732, 736, 230 P. 188, 190 (1924).
260. 146 Cal. App. 3d 464, 194 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1983).
261. Id. at 467, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
262. 168 Cal. App. 3d 1021, 214 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1985).
263. Id. at 1024, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 636. Accord Bowman v. Bowman, 171 Cal. App. 3d 148,
217 Cal. Rptr. 174 (1985) (generally following Gonzales).
264. 191 Cal. App. 3d 319, 236 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1987).
265. Id. at 325-26, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
266. Id. at 325, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
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To conclude that employee group term life insurance, or for
that matter any form of term insurance with no cash value, is not
community property has serious implications when the noninsured
spouse predeceases the insured spouse. If the policies are not
community property, then the predeceased spouse would have not
power to make a testamentary or nonprobate transfer of an interest
in the proceeds of the policy. However, this conclusion is incorrect.
After In re Marriage of Brown,267 the fact that a property right
is not vested, contingent, or of no value is not an acceptable reason
to exclude the property right from community characterization.6 8
Assuming the term life insurance is characterized as community
property and the noninsured spouse predeceases the insured spouse,
the extent of the deceased spouse's community interest in the
policy must be determined. If the deceased spouse's community
interest is based on the cash value or related interpolated terminal
reserve value, the interest is zero since term life insurance by
definition only provides protection for the policy period and
accumulates no reserve or residual value. If the noninsured spouse
attempts to make a testamentary disposition of her community
interest in her spouse's term life insurance policy, the interest
would be worthless. The extent of the noninsured spouse's interest
was clearly a major issue considered by the court of appeal in
Logan, which argued that the only community interest in such
insurance is the prepaid insurance premiums paid during
marriage.2 " The court's position in Logan apparently overrules
Modern Woodmen of America v. Gray27° which held that, at least
in -the case of the insured's death, community and separate interests
in life insurance should be based on apportionment of all premiums
paid while the policy is in effect.27
267. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
268. Id at 844-47,544 P.2d at 566-68, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 638-40. See, e.g., In re Marriage of
Ames, 57 Cal. App. 3d 838, 129 Cal. Rptr. 334, 336 (1976) (stating that In re Marriage of Brown
eliminated the distinction between vested and unvested interests in employee group plans); In re
Marriage of Smith, 56 Cal. App. 3d 247, 128 Cal. Rptr. 410, 411 (1976) (citing the holding of In re
Marriage of Brown).
269. Logan, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 324, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
270. 113 Cal. App. 729, 299 P. 754 (1931).
271. Id at 734, 299 P. at 755.
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One solution for determining the uninsured deceased spouse's
community interest in term life insurance is to measure the interest
by the cash surrender or interpolated terminable reserve value of
the policy, unless the insured dies while covered by premiums paid
with community funds. In that case, the proceeds would be
allocated on the basis of the total premiums paid with separate and
community funds. This result retains the apportionment theory of
Modem Woodmen, while recognizing the lack of any real value in
the community interest of the predeceased spouse. The "no value-
no community property" rule of Logan is not recommended.272
Another solution is to continue the apportionment rule after
death, as discussed below. In Scott v. Commissioner,273 Mrs.
Scott predeceased her husband, leaving her entire estate to their
two sons.274 At the time of her death, the husband maintained
two life insurance policies on his own life.27" These policies were
purchased with community fundsY.27 One-half of the policies were
included in Mrs. Scott's estate.27 7 Thus, one-half of the cash
surrender value of the policies was subject to federal estate tax.278
Mr. Scott subsequently changed the beneficiaries to the two sons
and continued premium payments on the policies until his
death.279 One-half of the insurance proceeds was included in Mr.
Scott's estate °.28 The IRS sought to include one hundred percent
of the proceeds less the one-half cash surrender value previously
included in Mrs. Scott's estate.281
Interpreting California law, the federal court of appeals rejected
the IRS's contention that Mrs. Scott's community interest in the
policy was limited to one-half of the cash surrender value at her
272. See supra notes 264-271 and accompanying text (discussing Logan).
273. 374 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1967).







281. Id at 157.
405
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
death.282 The court held that upon Mrs. Scott's death, her sons
became tenants in common in the policies with their father.283
When Mr. Scott continued to pay the premiums, admittedly with
separate funds, his proportionate interest in the policies was
increased, while the proportionate interest of his sons
decreased.284 Upon Mr. Scott's death, a proportionate share of the
proceeds would be included in his estate, based upon the proportion
of premiums paid with community or separate funds.2 5 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit applied apportionment based on premium payments
to post death premium payments.286
The tenants in common approach of Scott is a reasonable way
to determine property interests in life insurance policies where the
noninsured spouse is the first to die. However, insurance companies
will likely resist attempts by the noninsured spouse's executor and
successors to assert rights in the policies reserved to the owner. A
more realistic measurement of the deceased spouse's community
interest in the policy is the surrender value of the policy. Such a
measurement permits the policy owner to assert all other policy
rights and pay additional premiums. Thus, the deceased spouse's
interest would be limited to the cash surrender value at his death
and would no longer include a share of the proceeds on the
subsequent death of the insured spouse. 87 The deceased spouse's
successors are denied participation in the interest or growth factor
attributable to that value after death. In most modem cash value or
universal life insurance policies, there is an investment element





287. There is extensive authority on the classification of the insurance proceeds as community
property. See, e.g., Polk v. Polk, 228 Cal. App. 2d 763, 781, 39 Cal. Rptr. 824, 835 (1964) (holding
group life insurance proceeds are community property; Gettman v. Los Angeles, 87 Cal. App. 2d 862,
865, 197 P.2d 817,819 (1948) (holding employee plan proceeds are community property)); Modem
Woodmen of Am. v. Gray, 113 Cal. App. 729, 733-34, 299 P. 754, 755 (1931) (holding fraternal
benefit society policies are community property). See also, Tyre v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 54 Cal. 2d
399, 404, 352 P.2d 725, 728, 6 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (1960) and Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Fancher, 219 Cal.
351, 355, 26 P.2d 482, 483 (1933) (both cases illustrating a variety of other life insurance policies,
the proceeds of which are community property).
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which will continue to grow. However, defining that element in
legislation is almost impossible.
Where a spouse is named as the beneficiary of a community
property life insurance policy, the "inchoate gift" rule applies.88
Cases have held that by naming a spouse as the beneficiary, the
insured spouse makes an inchoate gift to the other spouse of the
insured spouse's community interest in the plan, which becomes
complete upon the insured spouse's death.289 Thus, the proceeds
of the policy constitute the separate property of the surviving
spouse.290 This inchoate gift-separate property result should be
considered in the context of cases which have forced the surviving
spouse to elect between rights as a beneficiary under such policies
and community property rights. In Mazman v. Brown,291 the
husband named his wife as a beneficiary as to one-third of the
policy proceeds and his parents as beneficiaries as to the other two-
thirds.2" The court of appeal held that the wife could not claim
one-third of the proceeds as separate property and still assert a
community claim as to one-half of the remaining two-thirds.293
In Tyre v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,294 the husband/insured
elected a life income benefit for his wife, with a remainder to a
child.2 95 The California Supreme Court held that the wife could
set this election aside and claim her community one-half, but could
not then also assert a claim as beneficiary.296
288. See supra notes 118-132 and accompanying text (discussing inchoate gift rule).
289. See, e.g., Sieroty v. Silver, 58 Cal. 2d 799, 376 P.2d 563, 26 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1962);
California-Western States Life Ins. Co. v. Kester, 129 Cal. App. 2d 476, 277 P.2d 70 (1955);
Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Jaffe, 121 Cal. App. 2d 241, 263 P.2d 82 (1953).
290. See In re Millers Estate, 23 Cal. App. 2d 16,18,71 P.2d 1117,1117 (1937) (holding that
husband's designation of a beneficiary to a beneficial association for which community funds were
used to pay his membership fees and dues initiated an inchoate gift of such money to the
beneficiary).
291. 12 Cal. App. 2d 272, 55 P.2d 539 (1936).
292. Id. at 276, 55 P.2d at 539-40.
293. Id. at 277, 55 P.2d at 541-42.
294. 54 Cal. App. 399, 353 P.2d 725, 6 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1960).
295. IM. at 402, 353 P.2d at 15, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
296. IM. at 405, 353 P.2d at 17, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
The forced election decisions are consistent with the inchoate
gift theory since the latter assumes the transmutation from
community to separate property is contingent upon the donor's
death. If a gift causa mortis approach is followed, the decedent
accomplishes the same result as with a forced election under a
testamentary document. In other words, a forced election bequest
in a will also converts decedent's share of community to separate
property on death, but the transmutation is contingent on an
election.
However, if the insurance proceeds really become separate
property upon death, a difference arises insofar as creditors are
concerned. The liability of separate and community property for the
debts of either spouse is covered generally under California Civil
Code sections 5120.110 through 5120.160.297 In general, the
separate property of one spouse may not be applied to pay debts
incurred by the other spouse. 98 Further, California Probate Code
section 11444, dealing with the allocation of debts between the
estate of a deceased spouse and a surviving spouse, bases the
allocation of debts on the ratio of community property to separate
property.29 9 If the death of an insured spouse automatically
converts a community property asset into the separate property of
the surviving spouse, that property arguably cannot be reached to
pay the deceased spouse's debts or provide the basis for allocation
of such debts.
Interests in community property that pass at death from one
spouse to the other or, for that matter, pass to third persons, should
be no different than other assets which pass as the result of a
testamentary or nontestamentary disposition. The transferor
spouse's interest should retain its community character until the
transfer is complete. There should be no transmutation or automatic
conversion to separate property. However, there is authority to the
contrary, at least with respect to joint tenancies, which holds that
297. CAL. Cv. CODE §§ 5120.110-5120.160 (West Supp. 1991).
298. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 5120.130(b)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
299. CAL. PROB. CODE § 11444 (West 1991).
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surviving joint tenants take free and clear of claims against the
deceased joint tenant."°
Assuming that an insurance policy and its proceeds are both
community property, what are the rights of the spouses in the
policy while both spouses are alive? The insured spouse may, of
course, exercise all rights under the terms of the policy, including
designating a beneficiary. To the extent that the policy rights fall
into the category of management, it seems clear that the insured
spouse can exercise those rights without the other spouse's consent
under the equal management and control provisions of California
Civil Code sections 5125 and 5127.301 A policy owner's rights
include the right to cash the policy in, borrow against the policy,
select dividend options, and convert the policy into another form
of contract. However, as with the assignment of any community
property interest, the nonconsenting spouse should be able to set
aside the assignment of a community property life insurance policy
despite the owner's right to assign under the terms of the policy
under California Civil Code section 5125(b).3 2 Similarly, to the
extent that the owner spouse elects a beneficiary other than the
surviving spouse, and the surviving spouse does not consent, the
nonconsenting spouse may set that beneficiary designation
aside. °3 This right to set aside is absolute during the joint
lifetimes of the spouses."
As the foregoing indicates, the assignment of a life insurance
policy or its proceeds or the designation of a beneficiary is
regarded much like a lifetime gift of community property, even
though the transfer may not take effect until death. After the death
of the insured spouse, the nonconsenting spouse's right to set aside
is limited to one-half of the proceeds. 3 5 Further, where the
300. See Zeigler v. Bonnell, 52 Cal. App. 2d 217, 126 P.2d 118 (1942).
301. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5125, 5127 (West Supp. 1991).
302. CAL CIv. CODE § 5125(b).
303. Sieroty v. Silver, 58 Cal. 2d 799,803,376 P.2d 563,566,26 Cal. Rptr. 635, 638 (1962);
Typre v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 54 Cal. 2d 399, 404, 653 P.2d 725, 728, 6 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1960).
304. See Benson v. Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 355, 363, 384 P.2d 649, 653,33 Cal. Rptr. 257,
261 (1963).
305. See New York Life v. Bank of Italy, 60 Cal. App. 602, 603, 214 P. 61, 61 (1923).
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surviving spouse is named as the beneficiary to part of the
proceeds, the forced election rule may apply.306 The prior death
of the noninsured spouse does not change her community interest
in the policy or its proceeds. Similarly, the surviving spouse should
be able to set aside a settlement or payment option that confers
upon the surviving spouse less than one-half of the proceeds
payable under the policy, subject to a possible election.
Where the noninsured spouse consents to the designation of a
third person beneficiary, the courts assume, without prolonged
discussions, that the noninsured spouse's consent waives a
community claim against the proceeds of the insurance.3 7 In
Benson v. Los Angeles, 3°8 the California Supreme Court stated,
"In the case of insurance, any change in the beneficiary away from
the wife without her consent, and without a valuable consideration
other than substitution of beneficiaries, is voidable in its entirety by
her during her husband's lifetime. ' ' 3 9 There was no consent in
the Benson case.310
The language in Benson is a logical extension of the inchoate
gift rule. If the beneficiary designation is donative, the designation
is a gift and may, therefore, be set aside by a nonconsenting
spouse, but not by a consenting spouse. To permit a consenting
spouse to completely revoke her consent would be inconsistent
with the theory of waiver set forth in Benson. n
Where the noninsured, nonconsenting spouse predeceases the
insured spouse, the deceased spouse's personal representative or
successor in interest apparently has the right, and probably the
duty, to claim a one-half interest in the insurance policy for the
estate.31 2 The exercise of any rights over the insurance policy by
306. See supra notes 291-96 and accompanying text (discussing the forced election rule).
307. See, e.g., Benson, 60 Cal. 2d. 355,360-61,384 P.2d 257,651-52,33 Cal. Rptr. at 259-60
(1963).
308. Id at 363, 384 P.2d at 653, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
309. Id
310. Id at 362, 384 P.2d 649, 652, 33 Cal. Rptr. 260.
311. Id
312. See United States v. Stewart, 270 F.2d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 1959) (stating that for federal
estate tax purposes, the estate of the predeceased, noninsured spouse includes one-half of the
interpolated terminal reserve value assigned to the policy by the insurance company; this amount is
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the estate of the deceased spouse, other than the continuation of
premium payments, would be inconsistent with the contract rights
under the policy, assuming the surviving spouse is the owner.
Arguably, the only interest that passes to the heirs or beneficiaries
of the deceased spouse is either the right to one-half of the cash
surrender value at the deceased spouse's date of death or the right
to one-half of the insurance proceeds upon the insured's death.
If the surviving spouse changed the beneficiary after the death
of the consenting spouse, the change would affect only one-half of
the proceeds.313 However, if the surviving spouse desired to
borrow against the policy, would the surviving spouse be similarly
restricted to one-half of the available amount? Where the
predeceased, noninsured spouse consented to a beneficiary
designation, MacDonald indicates that the deceased spouse's
consent may be set aside by the decedent's estate, which claims a
community interest in the pension plan. 14 Although MacDonakd
involved an IRA beneficiary designation,1 5 there are clear
parallels between life insurance policies and other forms of death
benefits or contractual rights which provide for a nonprobate
transfer through the designation of beneficiaries by one or both
spouses. However, there are alsq differences, which are explored
below.
B. Death Benefit Plans
While the foregoing discussion focuses on life insurance
benefits, many of the same principles apply to other kinds of death
benefits, such as employee death benefits, self-employed retirement
plans (herein called Keogh plans), deferred compensation plans,
roughly equivalent to the cash surrender value in most cases, assuming the premiums are paid with
community funds).
313. Benson v. Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 355, 363, 384 P.2d 649, 653,33 Cal. Rptr. 257,261
(1963); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Italy, 60 Cal. App. 602, 603, 214 P. 61, 67 (1923).
314. Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262, 273, 794 P.2d 911, 919, 272 Cal.
Rptr. 153, 161 (1990).
315. Id. at 265, 794 P.2d at 913-14, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 155-56.
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death benefit plans, and IRAs. The contractual requirements of
these plans and, in some cases, applicable state and federal law,
tend to vest complete management of the plans in the employee,
self-employed person, or account holder. Except with respect to
issues of federal preemption or application of the terminable
interest rule,316 management of the above-described plans does
not materially differ from the control exercised by the insured
spouse over a life insurance policy.
The right to designate a death beneficiary under an employee
benefit plan may be limited by the terms of that plan. For example,
an employee may have no right to designate a beneficiary under a
death benefit plan sponsored by the employer. Logically, the
employee's spouse would be similarly restricted. In fact, it is not
clear that employee death benefits are properly classified as
community property.317 Although the benefits are earned during
marriage, the nonemployee spouse's interest may be only an
expectancy.31 However, once funds are removed from a death
benefit plan and come within the total control of a spouse, general
community property principles apply.3
19
The death benefit plan maintained by IBM for the surviving
spouse or children of employees provides an excellent
illustration.32 ° Under the provisions of this plan, if an IBM
employee dies while employed by IBM, a specified death benefit
is paid to the surviving spouse, if any, otherwise to certain
316. See infra notes 317-412 and accompanying text (discussing the terminable interest rule).
317. See, e.g., Williamson v. Williamson, 203 Cal. App. 2d 8, 11, 21 Cal. Rptr. 164, 167
(1962) (holding that a plan under which husband was entitled to withdraw contributions prior to
retirement or upon termination did not constitute community property).
318. See French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 778, 112 P.2d 235 (1941) (concluding that a
husband's right to retirement pay is an expectancy not subject to division as community property);
Williamson, 203 Cal. App. 2d at 11, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 166 (1962) (stating that "pensions become
community property, subject to division in a divorce, when and to the extent that the party is certain
to receive some payment or recovery of funds.-). But see In re Marriage of Camall, 216 Cal. App.
3d 1010, 1018, 265 Cal. Rptr. 271, 274 (1989) (stating that nonvested pension rights may be
community property subject to division upon dissolution of the marriage).
319. French, 17 Cal. 2d at 778, 112 P.2d at 236.
320. See Estate ofSchelberg v. Comm., 612 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that death benefits
payable, under a plan provided by IBM over which the insured has no control, are not decedent's
property).
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surviving issue.32 The employee has no control over this plan
and no right to designate a beneficiary.3" For federal estate tax
purposes, the benefits payable under this plan are not property
owned by the decedent and, therefore, are not included in the
decedent's estate.323
The contractual death beneficiary under most employee benefit
plans is usually the employee's surviving spouse. Thus, the issues
of transmutation addressed in this discussion do not arise where the
employee dies first. However, where the nonemployee spouse
predeceases the employee spouse, it is not clear whether the
deceased spouse's personal representative has any claim to benefits
under an employee death benefit plan. A claim by the nonemployee
spouse's representative would directly interfere with contractual
rights under the plan, which was distinguished in MacDonald.324
California Civil Code section 4800.8 addresses court orders
relating to rights under retirement plans to assure that the parties
receive their community rights in such plans, including death
benefits and survivor benefits.3z Section 4800.8 also covers the
division of retirement benefits paid on or after the death of either
party.326 The statute does not, however, by its terms, purport to
overrule the contractual provisions of a benefit plan. 27 In fact,
section 4800.8 specifically authorizes the court to order a party to
elect a survivor benefit "in any case in which a retirement plan
provides for such an election. ' '3 1 It appears that section 4800.8
does not apply to death benefits unless they arise under a
retirement plan.329
321. id. at 27-28.
322. 1&
323. Id at 29.
324. Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262, 267-68, 794 P.2d 911, 913-15, 272
Cal. Rptr. 153, 157-59 (1990).
325. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.8 (West 1988).
326. Id
327. Id
328. Id § 4800.8(b) (West 1988).
329. Id (specifically providing for division of retirement plans).
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The above discussion suggests that the community property
rights to designate beneficiaries for death benefits under any plan
should be subject to contractual limitations under the plan itself.
New legislation intended to clarify the rights of spouses to
designate beneficiaries, consent to beneficiary designations, and
revoke designation consents should be limited to situations where
the identity of the beneficiary is not determined under the terms of
the plan itself. Clearly, such contractual limitations can lead to
inequitable results. An employee who has earned a substantial
death benefit during marriage, which is only payable to a surviving
spouse, can divest the spouse of that benefit by divorce. Further, if
the nonemployee spouse is the first to die, the nonemployee spouse
cannot dispose of any part of the benefit even though the benefit
was clearly earned during the marriage. Short of direct interference
with contract rights, however, there is no satisfactory solution.
The California Supreme Court was faced with the problem of
contractual limitations on beneficiaries under pension plans in
Benson v. City of Los Angeles,"' which produced at least one
element of the terminable interest doctrine."3 ' In Benson, the
husband and wife divorced, but their property rights were never
adjudicated.3 2 The husband's employer provided a municipal
pension plan which would pay a death benefit to an employee's
widow.33 3 The husband subsequently remarried.33 4 Although the
court conceded that the pension was community property, it held
that the first wife had no vested interest in the pension plan.3 5
Thus, the first wife's community interest in the plan terminated
upon the husband's death.3 6 The court emphasized that the plan
at issue was a retirement plan for public employees and that there
was a public purpose in making provisions for a widow.33 7 The
330. 60 Cal. 2d 355, 384 P.2d 649, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1963).
331. Id at 361, 384 P.2d at 652, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
332. Id at 358, 384 P.2d at 650, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
333. Id at 359, 384 P.2d at 651, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
334. Id at 358, 384 P.2d at 650, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
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court limited its ruling to situations in which the employee spouse
could not designate a beneficiary.338
It is not clear whether Benson had the effect of converting the
pension plan into the husband's separate property. 39 Some courts
have established a distinction between a right to payment during
the employee spouse's lifetime, which falls under the general
community property rules, and death benefits, which may be
mandated by the form of the pension agreement.) °
Some years later, the California Supreme Court expanded the
terminable interest rule to hold that the community interest of a
nonemployee spouse in a public retirement plan was not subject to
testamentary disposition by the nonemployee spouse if she
predeceased the employee spouse.Y The court's holding in Waite
v. Waite was the clearest expression of the terminable interest rule
as it applied to transfers at the prior death of the nonparticipant
spouse. Later cases extended the doctrine to private retirement
plans. 2 For example, In re Marriage of Brueg3 43 held that
while it was actuarially correct to divide community interests in a
private noncontributory pension plan at divorce, nothing could be
done to mandate a death benefit payment to the nonparticipant
spouse. 3 ' The Bruegl decision was specifically overruled by the
338. Id. at 363, 384 P.2d at 654, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 262. See Gettman v. Los Angeles Dep't of
Water and Power, 87 Cal. App. 2d 862, 865-66, 197 P.2d 817, 819 (1948) (holding that where the
participant spouse can name a death benefit beneficiary, the nonparticipant spouse has an enforceable
community interest); Cheney v. City and County of San Francisco, 7 Cal. 2d 565, 568, 61 P.2d 754,
755-56 (1936) (holding that where parties had entered into a written contract providing that earnings
of each should be separate property, the surviving spouse was not entitled to proceeds from the
decedent's retirement plan).
339. See Culhane, Toward Pension Equality: A "Death Blow" to California's Terminable
Interest Doctrine, 12 COMMuNrrY PRoP. J. 199, 202-04 (1985).
340. See Phillipson v. Board of Admin. of Pub. Retirement Sys., 3 Cal. 3d 32, 49-50, 473 P.2d
765, 776-77, 89 Cal. Rplr. 61, 72-73 (1970).
341. Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 467-68, 492 P.2d 13, 20-21, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325, 332-33
(1972).
342. See infra notes 341-48 and accompanying text (discussing cases which extended the
terminable interest rule).
343. 47 Cal. App. 3d 201, 120 Cal. rptr. 597 (1975).
344. Mat at 206, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
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California Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Brown.45 Estate
of Allen346 and Marriage of Peterson 7 lend further support to
the expansion of the terminable interest rule.3
However, judicial resistance to the terminable interest doctrine
arose. One court of appeal refused to apply the doctrine to a public
retirement plan in part because the husband made direct
contributions of community property to the plan.349 Another
decision rejected application of the terminable interest doctrine to
any private pension plan.3
In response, the legislature adopted California Civil Code
section 4800.8 in 1986.31' This statute expanded the power of
California courts to divide pension and employee benefits at
divorce.352 The legislative intent was "to abolish the terminable
interest rule set forth in Waite v. Waite, [citation omitted], and
Benson v. City of Los Angeles, [citation omitted], in order that
retirement benefits shall be divided in accordance with Section
4800 ... . 353Thus, the legislative intent was two-fold. First, the
legislature sought to abolish the terminable interest doctrine as
delineated in Waite and Benson, which were not divorce cases.
354
Second, the legislature sought to abolish the rule as it applied in
divorce cases. Consequently, where there is no divorce, the
nonemployee spouse has a right to make a testamentary disposition
of his community interest in the employee's death benefit.
345. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
346. 108 Cal. App. 3d 614, 166 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1980).
347. 41 Cal. App. 3d 642, 115 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1974).
348. See Allen, 108 Cal. App. 3d at 617-18, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 655 (1980) (rejecting arguments
against extending the application of the terminable interest rule to private pension plans); Peterson,
41 Cal. App. 3d at 656, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 194 (1974) (permitting wife to share in husband's pension
rights prior to his death even though she had no vested interest in any amounts payable after his
death).
349. See Chinnside v. Board of Admin., 143 Cal. App. 3d 205,211, 191 Cal. Rptr. 605, 609
(1983) (concluding that the Benson-Waite line of terminable interest rule cases was inapplicable in
the case at bar).
350. See Bowman v. Bowman, 171 Cal. App. 3d 148, 152, 217 Cal. Rptr. 174, 176 (1985).
351. CAL Ctv. CODE § 4800.8 (West 1988).
352. See id. (empowering courts to make "'whatever orders are necessary or appropriate" to
assure each party is awarded an equal share of the community property upon dissolution of marriage).
353. 1986 Cal. Stat., ch. 686, sec. 1, at 506.
354. See supra notes 330-48 and accompanying text (discussing Waite and Benson).
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Four recent California court of appeal cases have upheld the
retroactive statutory abolition of the terminable interest rule."'5
Marriage of Taylor35 6 held that the terminable interest rule was
abolished in the case of a divorce.357 Estate of Austin3ss and
Estate of MacDonald"9 held that the rule was also abolished for
the purposes of transfers at death. 6° Marriage of Powers6
involved a marriage dissolution which occurred in 1979.362 The
trial court reserved jurisdiction over the community property
pension plan.363 Since the terminable interest rule had been
abolished retroactively for all purposes, the court of appeal held
that the abolition applied to the former spouse's unresolved
community interest in the pension plan.3" The court of appeal
in MacDonald concluded that the wife's community interest in the
pension plan in question had been terminated. 365 Therefore, the
court stated that "[n]o interference with contractual rights between
an employer -- private or public -- and its employee could have
occurred. '366
355. See In re Marriage of Powers, 218 Cal. App. 3d 626, 639,267 Cal. Rptr. 350,356 (1990)
(concluding that retroactive application of section 4800.8 furthers the state's interest in equitable
division of marital property); Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 213 Cal. App. 3d 456, 261 Cal.
Rptr. 653, 656-57 (1989) (concluding that the terminable interest rule has been abolished in all
contexts); Estate of Austin, 206 Cal. App. 3d 1249, 1255, 254 Cal. Rptr. 372, 377 (1988) (applying
the law in effect at the time of decedent's death, excluding the terminabler interest rule, in an
inheritance tax proceeding); In re Marriage of Taylor, 189 Cal. App. 3d 435, 440,234 Cal. Rptr. 486,
489-90 (1987) (applying section 4800.8 retroactively to determine wife's interest in husband's
retirement benefits).
356. 189 Cal. App. 3d 435, 234 Cal. Rptr. 486.
357. Id. at 440, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 489.
358. 206 Cal. App. 3d 1249, 254 Cal. Rptr. 372.
359. 213 Cal. App. 3d 456, 261 Cal. Rptr. 653.
360. Austin, 206 Cal. App. 3d at 1255, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 377; MacDonald, 213 Cal. App. at
456, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 656-57.
361. 218 Cal. App. 3d 626, 267 Cal. Rptr. 350.
362. led at 639, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
363. Id at 634, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 355-56.
364. Id. at 635-36, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
365. Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 213 Cal. App. 3d 456, 261 Cal. Rptr. 653, 657
(1989). The terminable interest rule was not discussed by the supreme court. Estate of MacDonald
v. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262, 266, 794 P.2d 911, 915, 272 Cal. Rptr. 153, 157 (1990).
366. MacDonald, 213 Cal. App. 3d 456, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
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it is technically arguable that the adoption of California Civil
Code section 4800.8 did not abolish the terminable interest rule for
all purposes. It is also technically arguable that the rule had either
been abolished or weakened to the point of extinction by case law
prior to the adoption of section 4800.8. As Professor Reppy points
out, the technical basis for application of the terminable interest
rule at death was effectively eliminated when Waite "was
legislatively jettisoned. "'67 The conclusion is inescapable that the
terminable interest rule should be laid to rest for all purposes.
Unfortunately, this kind of doctrine does not die easily. The
terminable interest doctrine arose when applied to "widow's"
pensions.3 Simply abolishing, the rule does not answer the
question of how to handle widow's pensions or other death benefits
which mandate payment only to specified persons and do not
permit an employee or participant to designate a beneficiary.
For all of its strong language about abolition of the terminable
interest rule, California Civil Code section 4800.8 appears to hedge
its bets. In the case of a marital dissolution, the statute orders the
court to do one of the following:
(a) Order the division of any retirement benefits payable on or after the
death of either party in a manner consistent with Section 4800.
(b) Order a party to select a survivor benefit annuity or other similar
election for the benefit of the other party, as specified by the court, in
any case where the retirement plan provides for such a selection.369
How should a court apply this direction where the death benefit
under the plan must be paid to a surviving spouse? Should courts
attempt to change the terms of the plan itself by, as some have
suggested, extending "surviving spouse" to include a former
367. Reppy, Update on the Terminable InterestDoctrine:Abolishedin California; Adoptedand
Expanded in Arizona, 14 COMMUNrrY PROP. J. 1, 2 (July 1987).
368. See, e.g., Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461,473-74,492 P.2d 13,21-22,99 Cal. rptr. 325,
333-34 (1972) (refusing to subject judicial retirement benefits to division upon death of participating
spouse).
369. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800.8 (West 1988) (emphasis added).
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spouse?370 In view of constitutional and other dangers in
changing the terms of a plan, should courts impose a lien or
constructive trust on the death benefit when paid? And what if, as
in the case of the IBM plan,371 there is a provision that the
benefit will be paid to children of the employee in the absence of
a surviving spouse? Should the children be forced to pay the
community share to the former spouse?
Perhaps an example will best illustrate why something as
simple as abolishing the terminable interest rule is not so simple
after all. A husband and wife have been married and living in
California for thirty years. During that time, the husband's
employer provided a death benefit payable to the surviving spouse
of any employee who dies while working for the company. The
wife dies in 1990. Under the wife's will, her entire estate passes to
her children. The husband remarries in 1991 and dies shortly
thereafter. Who receives the death benefit? Does part of the benefit
pass to the children under the deceased wife's will? If so, how
much of the benefit will pass? Since this is a nonvested property
right, contingent on the husband's continued employment with the
company, the community interest of the wife would probably be
valued under rules similar to those used in the case of nonvested
pension benefits on divorce. Assuming there is an interest in the
plan which passes under the deceased wife's will, may the
employer be compelled to pay it directly to the children, despite the
terms of the plan, or will the children have to seek collection from
the widow?
Valdez v. Ramire, 372 a Texas case involving a federal
preemption issue, dealt specifically with the above-stated
problem. 373 In Valdez, the wife was a civil service employee of
370. See In re Marriage of Nice, 230 Cal. App. 3d 444,452,281 Cal. Rptr. 415, 420 (1991)
(concluding that case law and section 4800.8 suggest that with respect to pension plans on dissolution
of marriage, community property rights have priority over contractual ones).
371. See supra notes 320-323 and accompanying text (discussing IBM employee illustration).
372. 574 S.W.2d 748 (1978).
373. 1&4 at 749.
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the federal government, which provided a pension plan. 4 The
pension plan provided retirement payments to the employee. 375 In
the event of the employee's death, the payments were to be paid to
the employee's surviving spouse or, under certain circumstances,
the employee's children, or both the spouse and children.3
76
There was no provision for payment outside of the immediate
family.377 The wife elected a joint and survivor annuity for
herself and her husband.378 Her husband predeceased the wife and
through intestate succession the husband's community property
passed to his two adult children. 379 The Texas Supreme Court
concluded that the children had no claim against their mother's
annuity since payment to the children would be contrary to the
terms of the Civil Service Act and the wife's election of a joint and
survivor annuity.380
Valdez was subsequently distinguished by the Texas Supreme
Court in Allard v. Frech.8' In Allard, the pension at issue was
a private retirement plan, the terms of which provided the
employee with options as to the payments under the plan.382 The
employee in Allard did not elect a joint and survivor annuity. 83
The Allard court distinguished Valdez on the ground that it would
have been "contrary to the entire contract, policy, and plan of the
Federal Retirement Act" to allocate benefits to the heirs of the
predeceased nonemployee spouse.384 It is not clear what the result
would have been if the plan in Allard had mandated a death benefit
only to a surviving spouse. However, Valdez and Allard noted that
certain assets, including pension claims, are subject to different
management and control provisions under which the participant
374. I&




379. Id at 749.
380. let at 751.
381. 754 S.W.2d 111 (1988).
382. 1& at 113.
383. Id at 114.
384. Id
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spouse has sole management and control.385 As a result, the
nonparticipant spouse could not object to the selection of a joint
and survivor annuity option in Valez or the failure to select that
option in Allard.38 6 A similar conclusion was reached in O'Hara
v. Public Employees Retirement Board,387 in which the Nevada
Supreme Court held that "[a]n employee spouse may select among
retirement options so long as the community property interest of
the nonemployee spouse is not defeated."38
The issue of federal preemption of death benefits from qualified
retirement plans must be considered in light of the various federal
laws governing these plans, in particular the Retirement Equity Act
of 1984.389 In general, regardless of any plan provisions or state
law to the contrary, most retirement plans are required to pay
benefits in the form of an annuity to the surviving spouse on behalf
of the deceased participant who had not yet retired or achieved
what is referred to as an annuity starting date.390 Where the
participant dies after the annuity starting date, usually the date of
retirement, the benefit must be in the form of a joint and survivor
annuity with the spouse.391 The nature, extent, and amount of the
required annuity payments depend upon the plan involved.3' The
joint and survivor annuity or survivor annuity may be waived with
a written election by the participant in which the spouse joins.393
The writing must designate the beneficiary and the form of benefit,
both of which may only be changed with the nonparticipant
spouse's signed general consent. A variety of other technical
requirements for these elections and consents are set forth in
385. Valdez, 574 S.W.2d 748, 751; Allard, 754 S.W.2d at 120 (Spears, J., dissenting &
concurring).
386. Valdez, 574 S.W.2d at 751; Allard, 754 S.W.2d at 120 (Spears, J., dissenting &
concurring).
387. 104 Nev. 642, 764 P.2d 489 (1988).
388. Id. at 644, 764 P.2d at 490.
389. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-397, § 203(b), 98 StaL 1441 (1984)
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 417 (1991)).
390. I.R.C. § 401(a)(11)(A) (1991).
391. Id
392. Id
393. LR..C. § 417(a)(1),(2) (1991).
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Internal Revenue Code section 417."9 Although there is no real
authority on point, most practitioners believe that this mandate of
the form of retirement benefits, particularly under private pension
plans, does not recharacterize the community or separate status of
the benefits.
The status of death benefits is not clear where the
nonparticipant spouse who has a community interest in the plan
predeceases the participant spouse. The Employee Benefits
Committee of the American College of Trusts and Estates Counsel
is currently seeking to clarify legislation in this area. The recent
study of the California Law Revision Commission on the repeal of
California Civil Code section 704, Passage on Death of Ownership
of U.S. Savings Bonds, is instructive in this respect. This study
suggested that California Civil Code section 704 be replaced with
a codified statement of applicable federal law or related federal
material. The Commission disagreed with this approach for various
reasons, including the possibility that federal law will not be
correctly stated, is frequently amended, and will control in any
case.395 These reasons are equally valid in the area of death
benefits.
Additionally, federal law does not preempt beneficiary
designations in all cases, such as the situation in MacDonald, and
preemption may not cover one hundred percent of the death
benefit.396 It is doubtful that the federal rules actually change the
community character of death benefits, whereas comparable state
law might be construed as changing its community status. In other
words, if a state statute specifically limits the right of a participant
to name a death beneficiary of a pension plan, the community
characterization of the benefit received under the plan might be
questioned.
Assuming the terminable interest rule has been or should be
abolished, is the abolition retroactive? Three California courts of
394. Id at § 417 (1991).
395. Cal. L. Revision Comm'n Staff Memorandum 90-91 (1990).
396. See, e.g., Savings and Profit Sharing Fund of Sears Employees v. Gago, 717 F.2d 1038,
1040 (1983) (holding ERISA did not preempt state court from awarding spouse one-half of
beneficiary's interest in a pension fund as part of a divorce property settlement).
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appeal have had no difficulty concluding that the abolition is
retroactive3 97 However, the abolition of the terminable interest
rule as it applies to property interests in death benefits, aside from
marital dissolution cases, could be deemed an alteration of property
rights of the spouses. But does the rule or its abolition deprive
spouses of vested rights? Does abolition of the terminable interest
rule impair contract obligations? The terminable interest rule was
not based on a contract or agreement between the spouses. Further,
the rule was judicially created and, as many cases indicate, the
extent of its application was never clear.39 The terminable
interest rule did not extend to transfers at death.399 Thus, the
abolition of the terminable interest rule may be analogous to
application of quasi-community property law in marital dissolution
cases, in which courts have held that there is no interference with
vested property rights.'
If the California terminable interest rule dictates that the
nonparticipant spouse has no community interest in a pension or
death benefit plan, but new legislation specifically confers upon the
nonparticipant spouse a testamentary power over the plan, a
constitutional issue may arise. Professor Reppy suggests that
benefits paid after death, which he characterizes as a future interest,
are the participant spouse's separate property under the terminable
interest rule."° The vested or contingent nature of this future
interest is irrelevant to the issue of constitutional protection.
397. In re Marriage of Powers, 218 Cal. App. 3d 626, 267 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1990); Estate of
Austin, 206 Cal. App. 3d 1249, 254 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1988); In re Marriage of Taylor, 189 Cal. App.
3d 435, 234 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1987). See Reppy, supra note 367, at 4 (discussing the retroactive
application of the abolition of the terminable interest rule).
398. Powers, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 635,267 Cal. Rptr. at 353 (noting that the terminable interest
rule was judicially-developed and that it was subject to "considerable appellate and academic
criticism.").
399. See In re Marriage of Nice, 230 Cal. App. 3d 444,450,281 Cal. Rptr. 415,419 (1991);
Powers, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 635, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 653 (quoting Chirmside v. Board ofAdmin., 143
Cal App. 3d 205, 208, 191 Cal. Rptr. 605, 606 (1983)).
400. Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558,568,43 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1965). Addison did not
extend to the transfer of quasi-community property at death. it at 565-66, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
401. Reppy, supra note 397, at 5.
402. Id.
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Thus, a statute giving the nonparticipant predeceased spouse
testamentary power over employee death benefits would permit a
nonparticipant spouse to dispose of the participant spouse's
separate property. This result exceeds the scope of California
Probate Code section 66.403
The Internal Revenue Service has issued a private letter ruling
discussing generally the terminable interest rule and the possible
impact of federal tax law.4 Although private letter rulings may
not be cited as precedent, private letter ruling 89-43-006 provides
useful commentary in this area. The ruling held that a
nonparticipant spouse's community interest in a pension plan was
included in her taxable estate for federal estate tax purposes even
though her interest terminated upon her death under applicable state
law and passed to the surviving spouse." 5 The Service's
conclusion was based in part upon the application of the terminable
interest rule as applied in Ablamis v. Roper.4 6 In Ablamis, the
trial court concluded that the terminable interest rule had not been
abolished for purposes of transfers at death.4" Moreover, the
Service concluded that preemption under federal law requires the
same result.4 °8
The result in the private letter ruling is correct in that it
acknowledges that the deceased spouse's interest in the death
benefit is community property which does not magically disappear
at death and magically reappear as the surviving spouse's separate
property. Rather, as the Service observed, the decedent's
community interest passes to the surviving spouse by operation of
state or federal law or the terms of the plan itself.409 To the
extent that a state or federal legislature can control the distribution
of community property at death, the legislature can mandate a
403. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 66 (West 1991) (defining quasi-community property).
404. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-43-006 (Oct. 27, 1989).
405. Id
406. No. 80 Civ. 20353 (D.C. N.D. Cal. 1989); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-43-006 (Oct. 27, 1989).
407. Ablamis, No. 80 Civ. 20353 (D.C. N.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd 937 F.2d 1450 (1991).
408. PFriv. LAr. Rul. 89-43-006 (Oct. 27, 1989).
409. Id
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testamentary or nonprobate transfer of this community asset as well
as any other asset.
Based on the foregoing, retroactive legislation permitting the
nonparticipant spouse to make a testamentary disposition of death
benefits probably is not subject to constitutional attack, but this is
by no means certain. This conclusion is based on the fact that the
terminable interest rule evolved through case law, that the extent
of its application has never been clear, and that the decisions
applying the rule do not specifically hold that death benefits are
something other than community property or that they
automatically lose their community identity upon death. Four
California decisions have found that the repeal of the terminable
interest rule was retroactive.410 However, the California Supreme
Court did not consider the issue in MacDonald.4n  Further,
adoption of the view that a pension or retirement benefit is
community property while both spouses are alive, but that the death
benefit arising from that plan automatically becomes separate
property at the death of either spouse, would seem to permit the
legislature to repeal the rule of automatic transmutation. However,
where a plan specifically provides that the payee shall be the
participant's surviving spouse or children, legislation which
automatically rewrites the plan to change the beneficiary
designation and allows a deceased spouse to transfer a community
interest in the benefit would interfere with contract rights.
The California Legislature may well decide to leave the above-
described issues to the courts. Hence, new legislation could only
confirm the right of the nonparticipant spouse to make a
testamentary disposition or consent to a nonprobate transfer of her
410. In re Marriage of Powers, 218 Cal. App. 3d 626, 267 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1990); Estate of
MacDonald v. MacDonald, 213 Cal. App. 3d 456,261 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1990); Estate of Austin, 206
Cal. App. 3d 1249,254 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1988); In re Marriage of Taylor, 189 Cal. App. 3d 435,234
Cal. Rptr. 486 (1987). For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 351-71 and accompanying
text.
411. Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262, 266, 794 P.2d 911, 914, 272 Cal.
Rptr. 153, 156 (1990). Although the court of appeal declined to apply the terminable interest rule to
the pension funds at issue, Mr. MacDonald did not challenge the lower court's decision in his petition
for review. Id.
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community interest in a retirement plan or death benefit in a
manner not inconsistent with the provisions of the plan or any
applicable state or federal law. If the terminable interest rule has in
fact been abolished for all purposes, legislation should not only
acknowledge the rule's abolition, but also permit the nonparticipant
spouse to act accordingly. New legislation should not specifically
authorize the spouse to make a disposition contrary to the
provisions of the plan or to alter any provisions of public
retirement plans which specify the identity of the death beneficiary
and should probably acknowledge the possibility of federal
preemption. To address the issue of retroactivity, without
attempting to resolve it, the new statute should be made effective
only for deaths occurring after the effective date of the legislation,
as are other California Probate Code provisions.412
C. Other Will Substitutes
There are a variety of other forms of will substitutes, such as,
Totten trusts, joint bank accounts, and agreements for the purchase
of business interests on the death of shareholders and partners,
which produce issues similar to those which arise with respect to
life insurance and death benefits. Unfortunately, after the court's
decision in MacDonald, these forms of will substitutes are also
suspect insofar as spousal consents are concerned. For example,
MacDonald raises the danger that a spousal consent to a sale of
community property stock under a corporate buy and sell
agreement could be rescinded upon the consenting spouse's death
if the personal representative argues that the price is inadequate and
deprives the beneficiaries of the estate of the stock's true
value.4
13
The Law Revision Commission is currently considering the use
of transfer-on-death designations for motor vehicles and vessels in
412. See CAL PROB. CODE § 3 (West 1991).
413. See MacDonald, 51 CaL 3d at 273, 794 P.2d at 919, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 161 (stating that
an underlying policy of § 5110.730 is "the desirability of assuring that a spouse's community
property entitlements are not improperly undermined ...").
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California.414 Given the number of Vehicle Code sections that
would be affected by this proposal,415 the best solution would be
to specifically bring all transfers of motor vehicles and vessels, due
to the owner's death, within the scope of California Probate Code
section 5000.416
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE IN SPOUSAL
CONSENT STATUTES
The effect of spousal consents to death beneficiary designations
and other forms of will substitutes involving community property
should be determined under gift rules, not transmutation rules.
While MacDonald was probably correct in its determination that
the spousal consent at issue did not result in a transmutation of the
husband's IRAs to separate property,417 the decision was incorrect
in its failure to recognize the effectiveness of the consent upon a
gift which took effect at death. Although the California Supreme
Court's review of MacDonald was limited to the issue of
transmutation, the language in footnotes four and five of that
review discounts the effectiveness of spousal consent in general
and the effectiveness of consent as a will substitute in
particular.
418
One of the most effective forms of a will substitute for transfer
of community property is the revocable living trust. A revocable
living trust is a lifetime transfer of property in a form which can
be revoked by at least one spouse.4 19 Upon the death of either
414. Cal. L. Revision Comm'n Staff Memorandum 90-141, TOD Registration of Vehicles and
Vessels (November 20, 1990).
415. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 5600-6502 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991) (providing for transfers of title
or interest in vehicles).
416. See CAT. PROB. CODE § 5000 (West 1991) (providing for form of nonprobate transfers
effective at death).
417. Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262, 272, 794 P.2d 911, 918, 272 Cal.
Rptr. 153, 160 (1990).
418. Id. at 267 nn. 4-5, 794 P.2d at 915 nf. 4-5, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 157 nn. 4-5.
419. M. KINEVAN, PERSONAL ESTATE PLANNINa (20th ed. 1989).
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spouse, a revocable living trust disposes of that spouse's
community interest in trust assets.
4 20
Former California Civil Code section 5113.5 provided that the
assets in a trust would retain their community status if the trust was
revocable during the joint lives of the spouses, limited trustee
management powers to those the spouses would have in the
community property, and could not be altered or amended unless
both spouses agreed.421 Section 5113.5 was replaced by current
California Civil Code section 5110.150, effective July 1, 1987.422
The new statute similarly provides that assets held in a trust will
retain community status if the trust is revocable during the
marriage and that the power to modify the trust as to the rights and
interests in that property during the marriage requires the joinder
or consent of both spouses.42 Unless the trust specifically
provides otherwise, it can be revoked by either spouse acting
alone.424 The management powers of the trustee are somewhat
broader than under the prior statute, and there is no requirement
that trust document specifically provide that assets in the trust will
retain their community status.425 Under section 5110.150, all
assets withdrawn from the trust retain community status.42
The statutory history of the revocable living trust defines
community property rights while both spouses are alive, but does
not deal with the dispositive provisions of the trust after the death
of one spouse.427 Since the other forms of will substitutes focus
on transfers at death rather than lifetime management, the revocable
trust may be distinguished from other forms of will substitutes.
However, revocable trust statutes and the Ninth Circuit decision in
Katz v. United States42 focus on the question of whether consent
to the terms of a trust results in a transmutation or waiver of
420. Id.
421. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 5113.3 (West 1983) (repealed 1986).
422. 1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 820, sec. 14 (enacting CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110.150).




427. Id § 5110.150 Legislative Committee Comment (West Supp. 1991).
428. 382 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1967).
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community property rights.429 Katz held that a consent does not
result in a transmutation or waiver."' Further, based on statutory
and case law, it is generally assumed that, barring a specific
transmutation, consent to the terms of a revocable trust will not
alter the consenting spouse's property rights in the trust until
death.431 In Katz, the court of appeals found that no transmutation
or conveyance of community property to the husband resulted from
the wife's consent to the establishment of the trust.
432
The statutory history of the revocable trust does suggest
possible alternative approaches to beneficiary designations for life
insurance, death benefits, and other forms of will substitutes. 33
One possibility is to require the consent of both spouses to select
a beneficiary.4' However, dual consent would be expressly
contrary to the provisions of most policies or death benefit plans
and does not address the issue of revocability of the beneficiary
designation.
Another possibility is to permit either spouse to revoke the
beneficiary designation while both spouses are alive. However, this
approach ignores the provisions of most policies or death benefit
plans and would force the insurer or plan administrator to
recognize the existence of a community interest in the plans or
benefit and honor a notice received from someone who is not a
party to the contract.
In the case of life insurance policies, the Wisconsin version of
the Uniform Marital Property Act follows the second alternative,
to some extent, with the following provisions:
429. Id.; CAL. CQv. CODE § 5110.150 (West Supp. 1991); id. § 5113.5 (West 1983) (repealed
1986).
430. K2tz, 382 F.2d at 729-30.
431. See, e.g., In re Estate of Carson, 234 Cal. App. 2d 516,44 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1965).
432. Katz, 382 F.2d at 730.
433. California Law Revision Comm'n, Proposing Trust Law, 18 CALL. REvIsION REP. 50
(1985).
434. See Bruch, Management Powers and Duties Under California's Community Property
Laws; Recommendations for Reform, 34 HASTIN Os LJ. 227 (1982) (discussing the requirement of
both spouses' consent to beneficiary designations).
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(e) A written consent in which a spouse consents to the designation of-
another person as beneficiary of the proceeds of a policy . . . is
effective, to the extent the written consent provides, to relinquish or
reclassify all or a portion of that spouse's... ownership interest or
proceeds of the policy without regard to the classification of property
used by a spouse or another person to pay premiums on that policy.
Unless the written consent expressly provides otherwise, a revocation
of a written consent is effective no earlier than the date on which it is
to reclassify and property which was reclassified or in which the
revoking spouse relinquished an interest from the date of the consent to
the date of revocation.
(f) Designation of a trust as the beneficiary of the proceeds of a policy
with a marital property component does not by itself reclassify that
component.435
The Wisconsin provisions, last amended in 1985, are confusing.
The statute permits the use of consent to transmute a marital
property interest in a policy, but indicates that the consent to a
beneficiary designation is revocable. 3 A revocation, however,
does not change the transmutation of interests. Two things are
being confused here: a consent which operates as a waiver or
transfer of a community or separate interest in the policy, a
transmutation; and a procedure for consenting to and revoking a
consent to a beneficiary designation.
To afford some protection to the insurance companies, section
766.61(2)(b) of the Wisconsin Statutes clearly provides that an
insurer may rely on its own records. 37 If an insurer takes action
based on the policy provisions and its own records, the insurer
cannot be held liable.438 Classifying the policy as marital property
does not affect the insurer's duties. 439 However, if the insurer
receives notice of a claim against the policy at least five days
before taking action, and documentation of that claim is received
within fourteen days thereafter, the insurer can pbstpone action
435. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.61(3)(e),(f) (West Supp. 1991).
436. Id.
437. Id. § 766.61(2)(b)(1) (West Supp: 1991).
438. Id.
439. Id § 766.61(2)(b)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
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until the claim is resolved.' 0 Documentation may be in the form
of a decree, a marital property agreement, a written directive signed
by the beneficiary and surviving spouse, a consent as discussed
above, or proof that legal action has been commenced."'
The Wisconsin statute functions as an inchoate gift rule as well
as a transmutation statute, since it results in reclassification of the
policy or premiums. A transfer of a policy or its premiums is a
revocable gift or transmutation, except to the extent that interest on
the policy accrues between the date of consent and the date consent
is revoked. While the Wisconsin approach is good in many
respects, the most questionable aspect of the statute is the extent of
transmutation effected. For example, if only a beneficiary
designation consent is involved, it is difficult to see the policy
behind classifying the designation consent as a transmutation rather
than simply a gift which becomes complete at death. An actual
transmutation of the policy or premiums should be handled under
the usual transmutation rules. On the other hand, the revocability
provision of the statute accords with the consenting spouse's right
to change his mind regarding beneficiary designations, settlement
options, and other decisions relating to insurance policies. The
statute does lack a requirement of notice of revocation, both to the
insurer and the other spouse, which seems a reasonable
requirement. Also, thought should be given to an automatic
revocation provision in the event the policy owner seeks to change
a beneficiary or exercise other rights under the policy.
Section 12(c)(5) of the Uniform Marital Property Act, from
which the Wisconsin version is derived, also applies a
transmutation consent rule to life insurance as follows:
Written consent by a spouse to the designation of another person as the
beneficiary of the proceeds of a policy is .effective to relinquish that
spouse's interest in the ownership interest and proceeds of the policy
440. Id § 766.61(2)(c)(1) (West Supp. 1991).
441. Id. § 766.61(2)(c)(2) (West Supp. 1991).
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without regard to the classification of property used by a spouse or
another to pay premiums on the policy.
442
In view of the confusing language in the Wisconsin statutes, which
permit a transmutation with regard to a beneficiary designation, and
the MacDonald argument that a consent is not a transmutation,"3
the designation of a beneficiary, exercise of rights or options under
a policy or plan, or spousal consent to the exercise of these rights,
should not result in a transmutation of either spouse's community
interest in the plan, unless there is express written documentation
of transmutation.
A third approach to the consent issue is to require the
nonparticipating spouse's written consent to change the beneficiary
designation or other options under the plan or policy. This
approach is subject to the same objections as the requirement that
both spouses consent to any beneficiary designation. Furthermore,
the third alternative overlooks the problems created by marital
disharmony. Thus, this approach is not a good solution.
Following the lead in the revocable trust area, the exercise of
rights in insurance policies, pension plans, Keoghs, IRAs, and other
assets which may pass by contractual designation while both
spouses are alive should fall within basic management and control
rules, regardless of the consent of the nonowner spouse. The
Wisconsin statute illustrates the problems of conferring
management rights upon a nonowner spouse. To the extent a
nonowner spouse believes his community interest in the policy or
plan is being mishandled or is in jeopardy, he can seek relief from
the courts under California Civil Code section 5125.1, or in the
case of pension plans, under California Civil Code sections 4363
through 4363.2. 4"
The new statutes should clearly provide that consents or
waivers only as to death beneficiary designations are not deemed
transmutations of community or separate interests in these policies
442. UNIW. MRITAL PROPERTY Acr §12(c)(5), 9A U.LA. 127 (1987).
443. Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262, 272, 794 P.2d 911, 918, 272 Cal.
Rptr. 153, 160 (1990).
444. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5125.1, §§ 4363-4363.2 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
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or plans, absent specific compliance with California Civil Code
section 5110.730."4 Designation consents, which must be written,
should be revocable while both spouses are alive, much like
revocable living trusts. However, if the owner spouse changes a
beneficiary without obtaining a new consent from the other spouse,
the consent should be automatically revoked. The designation of a
beneficiary or the exercise of any other rights under a plan or
policy by one spouse without the written consent of the other
spouse should not affect the community property interest of the
other spouse in the plan or policy. This last proposal is merely a
restatement of existing law, which provides that upon the death of
either spouse, the surviving spouse's one-half community interest
in the plan or policy would be fully vested, but subject to a forced
election." 6
It has been suggested that spouses have the power to make a
nonprobate transfer of their community interest in assets which
normally pass outside a will, such as life insurance policies or
death benefits."' However, it is extremely unlikely that any
insurance company, trustee, or pension plan administrator will
accept a beneficiary designation other than from the owner of the
life insurance policy or the plan participant.
Present and proposed legislation on nonprobate transfers of
community property should clearly provide that spouses have the
power to dispose of their community interest in community assets
by either of the following:
(1) a nonprobate transfer at death, if the transferor is authorized to do
so by a written instrument described in Probate Code section 5000, or
445. See id. § 5110.730 (West Supp. 1991) (requiring an express written declaration to effect
a transmutation).
446. See supra notes 291-96 and accompanying text (discussing forced elections).
447. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Saslow, 40 Cal. 3d 848, 710 P.2d 346, 221 Cal. Rptr. 546
(1985) (concluding that transfer of husband's insurance policies was ineffective specifically because
wife exerted undue influence on husband); Life Ins. Co. of North Am. v. Cassidy, 35 Cal. 3d 599,
676 P.2d 1050, 200 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1984) (holding that marital agreement permitting husband to
change beneficiary on life insurance policy free from wife's community property interest was valid
waiver of wife's rights in the policy).
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(2) a testamentary disposition or succession, if the transferor is not
authorized to make a nonprobate transfer at death under a written
instrument.
To the extent that one spouse makes an irrevocable lifetime
transfer of an interest in a plan or policy without full consideration,
the statutes should clearly provide, in accordance with existing law,
that the other spouse can set the transfer aside entirely. To the
extent that the action taken is revocable, the other spouse cannot
set it aside, but should retain testamentary power over her full
community interest. In other words, a beneficiary designation by
one spouse cannot apply to the community interest of the other
spouse without the other spouse's written consent.
The statutes should also provide that to the extent one spouse
irrevocably designates a beneficiary or irrevocably assigns any
interest in a plan or policy with the written consent of the other
spouse, neither spouse can set aside the transfer or assert a
community interest in the death benefit. The transfer should be
deemed a completed gift with consent, and even if the benefits are
not received until death, neither spouse should be able to set the
transfer aside. However, this action should not be construed as a
transmutation of the consenting spouse's community interest in the
plan to the separate property of the other spouse. If the transfer is
to the other spouse rather than to a third party, there must be
written evidence that the consent was intended to operate as a
transmutation.
If one spouse's beneficiary designation is revocable, and the
other spouse consents to the designation, the gift should be deemed
complete upon the death of either spouse, as to the consenting
spouse's community interest. The surviving spouse's revocation or
alteration of the beneficiary designation should be ineffective as to
the community interest of the predeceased consenting spouse, and
the community interest should pass in accordance with the
beneficiary designation to which the decedent consented.
If the transferor spouse revokes or alters the transfer without
the written consent of the other spouse, the other spouse's consent
is made ineffective. Further, the consenting spouse may, during the
434.
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transferor spouse's lifetime, withdraw the consent. In either case,
the property will be distributed as if no consent was obtained.
The preceding recommendations could be implemented with the
following statutory changes.
First, California Probate Code section 5000(a) would be
adopted as follows:
(a) A provision for a nonprobate transfer on death in an nsurance
policy, contract of employment, bond, mortgage, promissory note,
certified or uncertified security, account agreement, custodial agreement,
deposit agreement, compensation plan, pension plan, individual
retirement plan, employee benefit plan, trust, conveyance, deed of gift,
marital property agreement, or other written instrument of a similar
nature or any other written instrument effective as a contract, gift,
conveyance, or trust is not invalid because the instrument does not
comply with the requirements for execution of a will.
The above language, borrowed from Uniform Probate Code section
6-201, would clarify the application of the law to partnership
agreements, stock redemption plans, buy-sell agreements, powers
of appointment, and other such agreements. 4" Otherwise, the
above-stated language follows proposed legislation already
developed by the Law Revision Commission staff.
Second, California Probate Code section 5001, defining
property which is subject to nonprobate transfer, would be adopted
as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, a provision for a nonprobate
transfer on death in a written instrument described in Section 5000 may
dispose of the following property:
(a) The transferor's separate property.
(b) The one-half of the community property that belongs to the
transferor under Section 100, if the written instrument authorizes
the transferor to make a nonprobate transfer.
448. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 6-201, 8 U.LA. 534 (1983).
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(c) The one-half of the transferor's community property that
belongs to the transferor under Section 101, if the written
instrument authorizes the transferor to make a nonprobate transfer.
(d) In the event the surviving spouse of the transferor has
executed a written consent to a nonprobate transfer, then
subject to the provisions of Section 5003, the transferor may
dispose of the surviving spouse's community or quasi-
community interest in property subject to the nonprobate
transfer, if the written instrument authorizes the transferor to
make a nonprobate transfer.
The first three subdivisions follow the recommendations of the Law
Revision Commission Staff."' Subdivision (d) specifically
authorizes a spousal consent to the nonprobate transfer.
Third, California Probate Code section 5002, describing the
testamentary power of a spouse not authorized to make a
nonprobate transfer, would be added as follows:
To the extent the written instrument described in Section 5000 does not
authorize a spouse to make a nonprobate transfer as described in
Section 5001, such spouse's community interest in the property subject
to the nonprobate transfer shall be disposed of in accordance with
Section 6101 or Sections 6400-14, inclusive. This provision shall apply
regardless of which spouse is the first to die, but shall not apply to the
extent a spouse has executed a written consent to a nonprobate transfer
pursuant to Section 5001(d).
This proposed section would serve to clarify the nonconsenting
spouse's right to make a testamentary disposition of her community
interest in property subject to nonprobate transfer, unless she has
executed a written consent.
Fourth, California Probate Code section 5003, describing the
effect of written consents to nonprobate transfer, would be added
as follows:
(a) A written consent by a spouse to a nonprobate transfer pursuant to
California Probate Code section 5000 shall not be deemed a
relinquishment or transmutation of such spouse's community or separate
449. Id.
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interest in the property subject to the nonprobate transfer unless such
consent meets the requirements of Civil Code section 5110.730.
(b) Unless the written consent described in Paragraph (a) provides
otherwise, the consent can be revoked in writing only during the
lifetime of the consenting spouses, and is effective only with respect to
the beneficiary or transferee named in it. Any revocation is effective no
earlier than the date executed by the consenting spouse.
(c) Any change of beneficiary or transferee with respect to a nonprobate
transfer described in Probate Code section 5000 or during the joint
lifetimes of the spouses shall automatically revoke entirely a written
consent described in Paragraph (a) unless the consent expressly provides
otherwise; provided, however, that in the event of the death of the
consenting spouse, any subsequent change in beneficiary or transferee,
or exercise of other rights over the property subject to the nonprobate
transfer by the surviving spouse shall not be effective as to the
community interest of the deceased spouse in such property, which shall
be transferred in accordance with the provisions of the nonprobate
transfer to which the predeceased spouse consented.
Subdivision (c) might alternatively provide the following:
(c) Any change of beneficiary or transferee with respect to a nonprobate
transfer described in Probate Code section 5000 shall revoke entirely a
written consent described in Paragraph (a) unless the consent expressly
provides otherwise, and the consenting spouse's community interest in
such property shall be disposed of in accordance with Section 6101 or
Sections 6400-14, inclusive.
(d) Unless the written consent described in Paragraph (a) provides
otherwise, such consent cannot be revoked after the death of the
consenting spouse, either before or after the death of the other spouse,
and the community interest of the deceased consenting spouse, shall be
distributed to the beneficiary or beneficiaries to whom the consent
applies.
Subsection (a) codifies the result in MacDonald.450 Subsection (b)
specifically reserves the consenting spouse's right to revoke a
consent, but limits the period of revocation to the consenting
450. See Estate of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262, 794 P.2d 911, 272 Cal. Rptr.
153 (1990).
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spouse's lifetime. Subsection (c) clearly provides that the spouse
authorized to make a nonprobate transfer can change the
beneficiary or transferee at any time. If the beneficiary or transferee
is changed while both spouses are alive, consent is revoked. If
changed after the consenting spouse's death, the beneficiary or
transferee to whom the decedent consented will take a community
interest, assuming that the deceased spouse intended her community
interest to pass to that person. The alternate subsection (c) assumes
that if the beneficiary is changed after the consenting spouse's
death, the consent is also automatically revoked. However, the
alternate subdivision (c) provides that the consenting spouse's
community property interest passes by testamentary disposition.
Subsection (d) reverses the MacDonald result with regard to
post mortem revocation of consent.45 If the proposed alternate
subsection (c) is adopted, the provision should end with the
language, "either before or after the death of the other spouse."
Fifth, a new provision relating to gifts in view of death would
be added to the California Civil Code as follows:
A gift in view of death of property in which the spouse of the donor
has a community interest is effective only as to the donor's community
interest in such property; provided, however, that in the event that the
donor's spouse consents in writing to the gift, the consent shall, unless
either the gift or consent is revoked by either spouse, be effective as to
the consenting spouse's community interest in the property. A
revocation of the gift shall automatically revoke the consent for all
purposes; a revocation of the written consent, if made during the
lifetime of both spouses, shall revoke the gift only as to the community
interest of the consenting spouse; an attempt to revoke the consent after
the death of either spouse shall be ineffective.
This recommended provision is not as extensive as those suggested
for nonprobate transfers because a gift in view of death is much
less likely to occur, the subject matter is limited, and the time
frame for revocation is much shorter.
451. See id. at 267, 794 P.2d at 918, 272 CaL Rptr. at 160 (concluding that there was no
substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that wife intended her consent to the
beneficiary designations to be a transmutation of her community interest in the IRAs).
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Finally, possible statutory provisions defining rights in
community property life insurance could include the following:
If a noninsured spouse predeceases an insured spouse, the community
or separate interest of the deceased spouse in the insurance policy shall,
in the absence of a written agreement or written consent to the contrary,
be a dollar amount equal to a fraction of the interpolated terminable
reserve plus prepaid premiums for the policy on the date of the
predeceased spouse's death; such fraction to be determined on the bases
of the total separate and community funds used to pay premiums during
the entire period the policy is in effect. To the extent the source of
premium payments cannot be traced, it shall be presumed all premiums
paid during the marriage were paid with community funds.
A possible addition to the California Civil Code could be made as
follows:
(a) If the insurance policy has no interpolated terminable reserve value
and the insured spouse dies during a period that the prepaid premiums
providing the insurance coverage at the date of the insured's death were
paid with community funds during the marriage, the community interest
of the predeceased insured spouse shall be determined in accordance
with paragraph (b).
(b) If the noninsured spouse survives the insured spouse, the community
or separate interest of the surviving spouse in then community or
separate interest of the surviving spouse in the insurance policy shall,
in the absence of a written agreement or consent to the contrary, be a
dollar amount equal to a fraction of the proceeds of the policy; such
fraction to be determined on the bases of the total separate and
community funds used to pay premiums during the entire period the
policy is in effect. To the extent the source of premium payments
cannot be traced, it shall be presumed that all premiums paid during
marriage were paid with community funds.
The above changes would clarify the extent of a noninsured
spouse's community interest in a life insurance policy. The Internal
Revenue Service's approach is generally followed in valuing a
community interest in life insurance where the noninsured spouse
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predeceases the insured spouse.452 The interpolated terminal
reserve is believe to better reflect the true economic value of the
policy, rather than its cash surrender value, although the two values
are often close.
The possible addition to the California Civil Code covers term
insurance with no cash surrender value, but implements the
suggestion in Logan that the surviving spouse has community
rights in the proceeds of an insurance policy paid for with
community funds."' The last part of the proposed statute simply
restates existing apportionment rules.
These proposed recommendations do not address all of the
problem issues regarding life insurance. They do not indicate how
the predeceased spouse's interest can be protected after his death,
as where the owner of the policy decides to cash the policy in or
borrow against it. Nor do these recommendations resolve the issue
raised by Scott as to whether the decedent's interest in the policy
will continue to grow to reflect its investment value and whether
the decedent's interest will translate into a share of the proceeds
upon the insured's death.454 These recommendations merely
define the extent of the deceased spouse's community interest in
the participant spouse's life insurance.
The following statutory change relating to nonparticipant
spouses' rights to dispose of interests in retirement plans and death
benefits should be considered:
A predeceased spouse may dispose of his or her community interest in
any contract of employment, compensation plan, pension plan,
individual retirement plan, employee benefit pan, or self-employed
retirement plan in which the surviving souse is the employee,
participant, or owner pursuant to the provisions of Probate Code
sections 5000-03, 6101, or 6400-14, to the extent such a testamentary
disposition or consent to a nonprobate transfer is not inconsistent with
the provisions of such contract or plan, or the provisions of any state or
federal law applicable to such contract or plan.
452. See supra notes 404-09 and accompanying text (discu.sing Internal Revenue Service's
approach).
453. See supra notes 264-271 and accompanying text (discussing Logan).
454. See supra notes 273-87 and accompanying text (discussing Scon).
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This proposed statute assumes the repeal or abolition of the
terminable interest rule and permits and nonparticipant spouse to
act accordingly, but not if such action is in conflict with the plan
or applicable law.
Because of the possibility of the surviving spouse's waiver of
rights to survivor benefits under Internal Revenue Code section
417,"' thought should be given to a new statute relating to the
effect of waivers of rights to survivor benefits under federal law,
such as:
A waiver of a right to a survivor benefit or other benefit under
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code will not be characterized as a
transmutation of the community property rights of the spouse or spouses
executing the waiver.
The execution of waivers of rights to joint and survivor annuities
or survivor benefits under the provisions of the Retirement Equity
Act of 1984 should not be construed as a transmutation of
community property rights.456
The provisions of California Probate Code sections 140 through
147, previously discussed, cover the waiver of property rights by
a surviving spouse.45 7 The scope of these provisions should
extend to nonprobate transfers. Thus, the following provision
should be added to Probate Code section 141(a): 458
(10) Any property right which may be subject to a nonprobate transfer
pursuant to Section 5000-03 of the Probate Code.
No specific reference has been made in existing statutes to
quasi-community property subject to testamentary disposition by
the acquiring spouse. The definition of quasi-community under
California Probate Code section 66 is applicable. 459 To the extent
455. See supra notes 393-94 and accompanying text (discussing I.R.C. § 417).
456. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, § 203(b), 98 Stat. 1441 (1984).
457. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (discussing CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 140-47).
458. CAL PROB. CODE § 141(a) (West 1991).
459. l § 66 (West 1991).
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that an insurance policy, death benefit, or other property which
could be the subject of nonprobate transfer is quasi-community
property, the language of existing statutes may be even more
confusing. The better solution would be one statute specifying that
for purposes of the interspousal transfer provisions, quasi-
community property, as defined under California Probate Code
section 66, shall be treated in the same manner as community
property where the acquiring spouse is the first to die.40 Thus,
a consent to a beneficiary designation would be covered by these
provisions if the acquiring spouse predeceases the consenting
spouse, but would be meaningless if the consenting spouse is the
first to die.
CONCLUSION
The MacDonald case encompassed a variety of issues relating
to lifetime transfers and transfers at death of community property
and caused the need for statutory clarification to become
apparent.461  The requirements for transmutation and
recharacterization of property rights were addressed by the
legislature in the 1985 additions to the transmutation rule, but it is
clear that further clarification is needed.462 The rights of spouses
to make testamentary dispositions of community and quasi-
community property in the traditional manner by will are well-
established. However, the increasing frequency of nonprobate
transfers at death, by contract or other method, requires legislative
action to define the community and quasi-community rights of the
spouses, particularly where only one spouse has the right to make
the disposition under the terms of the contract or plan. 63 Finally,
the nature and extent of community property rights in assets such
460. Id
461. See supra notes 18-56 and accompanying text (discussing Estate of MacDonald v.
MacDonald, 51 Cal. 3d 262, 794 P.2d 911, 272 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1990)).
462. See supra notes 7-17 and notes 193-222 and accompanying text (discussing CAL. Civ.
CODE §§ 5110.710-5110.740).
463. See supra notes 249-416 and accompanying text (discussing community property inteests
in life insurance policies, death benefit plans, and other forms of will substitutes).
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as life insurance policies and death benefits should be more clearly
defined. The emphasis should be to assure, to the extent possible,
equal rights of both spouses in all forms of community property,
regardless of the property's unusual characteristics, including equal
rights to transfer community property by gift or at death.
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